"I just don't like psychopathology."
Is There an Inability of the Humanities/ "Geisteswissenschaften"
to Become Interdisciplinary? –
With Some Thoughts on Narrative Metalepsis and Psychic Dissociation.

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((maximum of two pages: short description of the papers given, definition of the over all question of the conference on "Narratology beyond Literary Criticism"))

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It was the objective of the Hamburg conference on "Narratology beyond Literary Criticism" to support und further develop an interdisciplinary and inclusive approach towards narratology which encompasses both the philological and the social and psychological disciplines. The above mentioned contributions from researchers working on various narratological issues in different fields certainly provoked an inspired, intense, and productive discussion. It seems to me, however, that throughout the two days of the conference we completely failed to talk and think about just how difficult the task confronting us is, about how challenging, sometimes even nerve-wracking, it can be to go beyond the familiar and build interdisciplinary bridges in an integrative, in-depth fashion. Each of us, trained in a particular academic field, is profoundly moulded by her or his home discipline. As our home disciplines are fully-developed institutions with little inclination to encourage forays beyond their borders, it is up to their individual members to make the effort to venture into unfamiliar territory. The representatives from continental European countries and in particular from German speaking countries must have felt this more than most, for they work in environments where the borders between academic disciplines generally seem more rigid than they are in the Anglo-American countries. Becoming interdisciplinary (and international), then, is by its very nature a process of conflict in which we are torn between wanting to step into the unknown and, more or less consciously, shying away from leaving the secure ground of our academic home disciplines and go "beyond literary criticism". Our position is, as it were, an ambivalently (anti-)interdisciplinary one.

In his famous and much-quoted book about the interrelation of the researchers' personal anxieties and methodological choices, Georges Devereux was, as far as I am aware, the first person to extensively write on how social and behavioural sciences (as well as culture studies) are troubled by the fact that the researching subject is, of course, a subjective one. Here Devereux

underlined that this subjectivism does not only pose a problem but is an inescapable epistemological fact affecting all interactional studies and, if recognized as such and dealt with in a methodologically sound manner, may in fact become a valuable tool. However in Devereux's view, most scientific approaches (up to 1967 when he published his book) attempted to achieve scientific objectivity by neutralizing the researchers subjectivism and by reifying her/is object domain – which in the end is bound to fail or produce unsatisfactory and/ or misleading results. Instead the researcher of social and interactional phenomena should acknowledge (and appreciate) the subjectivism of her/is observation and obtain a (self-)reflexive external view of her/is perception and conclusions. Devereux also emphasized that this necessity of a systematic (self-)reflection – which in philosophical hermeneutics might correspond with the theoretical problem of the 'hermeneutic circle' – is not just an intellectual issue. It is also, and primarily, an emotional issue since it always also concerns the affect-related patterns behind the ways of thinking, procedures of research, and modes of forming (interpretive) conclusions which a particular researcher and/ or a particular field or tradition of research has opted for. Already the title of his book – *From Anxiety to Method in the Behavioural Sciences*[1] - shows that it is above all the methodological issues (the selection or rejection of certain methods of research and models of defining the object domain) which Devereux sees not just as a matter of epistemological reasoning but primarily as the expression of the specific interests and emotional needs of the persons/ institutions involved in performing research.[2] The title also indicates that anxieties play a major role in adopting or rejecting certain methodological approaches. Devereux provocatively states that "the methods, procedures and reference frames of a behavioural scientist do also have the function to reduce anxieties". This defence of anxieties, however, "often makes the methods turn into mere counter-transference reactions (i.e. an idiosyncratic impulse; H.W.) as well as into a compulsive acting-out which then masks itself as being scientific" (109).

Aside of Devereux's rather provocative style and aside of his in part rather extreme examples (involving the ethnological/ ethno-psychiatric study of grim tribal habits), one can generally deduce from his thoughts: One source of anxiety in social/ interactional studies lies in the fact that hermeneutic/ qualitative research always implies attempting to also obtain knowledge about oneself as a subject in relation to the objects being studied. We have since learnt (and will no doubt continue to learn) how methodological anxieties about this self-reflexive dimension

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[1] This is the original title from 1967; I quote and translate from the German edition 1973/ 1984.
[2] Also the thoughts of Habermas on the interdependence of insight and interests (*Erkenntnis und Interesse* 1968) should be recalled here; there Habermas utters a systematic critique of objectivist science and opts for methods of self-reflection, reason, and the methodical reconstruction and evaluation of the interactional functions in particular discourses and societal segments.

result in scientific/ methodological defence mechanisms and therefore hinder rather than encourage the process of acquiring knowledge in the social sciences and humanities. Ultimately, these anxieties having turned into methodological stances can even subvert what may start life as the intention to pursue an interdisciplinary and multi-methodological approach. Moreover, psychology has taught us that anxiety if it is not consciously recognized and dealt with as such tends to turn into aggressive affects which then generally triggers psychological defence mechanisms. As a result of this the person's field of view narrows which, of course, is an unfortunate epistemological condition to be in. Moreover, as Stavros Mentzos has since pointed out, this kind of semi- or unconscious process of affect-defence against anxieties both occurs in individuals and institutions/ structures. Institutions, too, have behavioural patterns, that is they may support and induce certain mechanisms of (inter)action and affect-defence, and they foster particular habits and mentalities.[3] Thus, engaging in interdisciplinary and multi-methodological work in the social sciences (and the philologies) after Mentzos and Devereux means to also consider and deal with the anxieties which particular methods and changes in methodology may arouse in individuals and institutions. It also means being prepared to focus self-reflexively on the rational and intellectual processes by which the subject chooses and defines a certain object domain and carries out research on it. Thus, the general recommendation is to always also engage in meta-research making the research process itself in its personal, methodological and institutional aspects the objects of investigation.

The philologies, the academic study of literature, art, history, and philosophy (and the home of text-based theoretical approaches) are generally little aware of the need for (self-)reflexive scrutiny of the interpreting subject, her/is methodology and research procedures. Social sciences' techniques of (self-)supervision, process control, and methodical hypothesis formation are hardly known there. The realization that the subjective factor in scientific research and academic debate cannot be avoided and therefore should not be denied but methodically used does not seem to be a key principal of training and research in main stream philologies. The inherent subjectivism of the philological self and its activities of text-interpretation and hermeneutical debate most often is recognized only on the level of general philosophical considerations not so much in its concrete methodological implications. Nonetheless, structural text-analysis does in fact present an approach which generally would lend itself to meta-research and might well contribute to facilitating the collaboration with social sciences interactional (and psychological) perspective. But structural text-analysis in itself isn't necessarily already an inter-actional ("handlungstheoretischer")

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[3] See Mentzos (1988) on the concepts of institutional defence and the institutional unconscious.

approach. (Also it seems doubtful whether one may assume that there is a structuralist consensus in main stream philologies.) Thus, when students and scholars of literature engage in interdisciplinary projects that also involve the social and psychological sciences – which is to be welcomed, since they are hardly ever encouraged to do so – it is all the more important to also develop and identify efficient (self-)reflexive procedures which fit their particular needs.[4]

From the perspective of qualitative social sciences which are more familiar with these techniques and have developed methods of process control, (self-)supervision and narrative (group) interviewing,[5] one step that could be taken is immediately apparent: conducting a reconstructive close reading of critical interaction as it unfolds in real-life discussions between colleagues on interdisciplinary research in narratology. This close reading would focus not only on the exchange of scientific/ methodological statements and arguments but also attempt to reconstruct the personal/ institutional motivations, needs and interests which are implicit to these arguments and are generally not explicitly articulated.[6] Engaging in such interactional meta-research could also contribute in terms of narratological theory because it would provide an opportunity to consider whether narration (within the context of institutional interaction/ discourse and institutional narration formation) may also be seen as a process of *interactional co-narration*. The study of these processes not only transcends the (philological) level of text but also goes beyond the level of the individual subject's psychology in that they are co-narratively and group-dynamically generated by plural entities.[7]

xxx 3. Epistemological ambivalences in interdisciplinary philology/ narratology. Methodology statement and summary of conclusions.

At the end of the two-day conference in Hamburg it seemed to me that (anti-)interdisciplinary anxieties and ambivalences had played a role at various points in the debate. Moreover, it seemed

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[4] This, of course, also applies to the main stream – non-interdisciplinary – hermeneutic field of exegetic literature studies since there, too, the necessity exists to (self-)reflexively examine the subjective factors which are at work in choosing the interpretive focus points and formulating hermeneutical assumptions.

[5] For methods of narrative interviewing see Fischer-Rosenthal and Rosenthal 1997; for methods of group interviewing see Bohnsack 2000.

[6] Such a reconstructive close readings of critical interaction could then be followed up by measures of in-depth interviewing of persons which are involved in the discussion and are members of the pertinent institutions [here of philology] in order to reconstruct the personal/ biographical and institutional experiences which may be invested in certain epistemological and methodological positions.

[7] This introduces an area of research that has been largely ignored both by narratologists and social scientists and certainly has not received much attention to date in the study of literature in general: group analysis and qualitative social research on the interaction and narration found in and performed by groups, networks, and institutions (see the handbooks on group-analysis by Tschuschke 2000, Haubl and Lammot 1994; on narrative group interviewing in general see Bohnsack, in the context of media studies see Weilnböck 2002 f/g, 2003d).

that these ambivalences are deeply ingrained in the institutional context of narratology and of the philologies in general. Thus, I felt encouraged to try my hand at giving a close reading of one particular sequence of the interaction among the discussants – in which I myself was participating – and make an attempt to illuminate these ambivalences and the effects they had on the interaction. What I had in mind methodologically is a reflective procedure of *(self-)analytical participation* in the interactional scene - similar to what in qualitative social sciences is known as *immersed field study* ("teilnehmende Beobachtung") (and what in psychoanalysis is known as counter-transference analysis). Such an attempt, I felt, could possibly help shed light on the interactional and co-narrational dynamics which come into play when the philologies/ "Geisteswissenschaften" engage in situations of interdisciplinary exchange (in particular in the German speaking, non-Anglo-American academic spheres).

The principal motivation which moved me to pursue this is the hope that the fostering of systematic meta-research of this kind could help making interdisciplinary research in the philologies less problem-stricken and more productive. The fact that I myself was not only member of the conference but also took part in the interaction of this very sequence at first made me feel somewhat self-conscious about this project – in this respect, I think, I was still very much a philologist myself (having received my academic socialization in the field of German studies/ "Germanistik"). Focusing on social sciences methodologies (as quoted above) and also on theories of counter-transference (coming from psycho-therapy studies) helped me to overcome this. Another hesitation I felt was in fact a quite valid one and goes back to the fact that the empirical basis of my close reading is quite narrow; I am painfully aware that in terms of data documentation I am left with nothing more than my subjective memory. Therefore this close reading cannot claim to be a state-of-the-art qualitative study; it will at best provide some preliminary, explorative observations about the interactional and co-narrational dynamics of narratology (and the philologies) vis-à-vis interdisciplinary approaches.

Departing from this provisional close reading I will also include some thoughts about the institutional context of (philological) narratology, which in this case mostly pertains to the DFG (the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" [DFG], German Research Foundation which is comparable to the NEH and/or NSF in the United States) and the DFG's recent funding policies in the philologies. xx Here, I will also refer briefly to another project of interdisciplinary cultural studies under the auspices of the DFG. Moreover, at this point of the publication-history of my conference paper, I will also include some observations and thoughts on a second sequence: the interaction which unfolded between the editors of the conference reader and myself in the wake of

which the close reading was rejected from being included into the conference reader (whereas my conference paper and some general remarks about the 'difficulties of interdisciplinary work' were welcomed). This second sequence, I felt, does illustrate well how the interactional dynamics which revealed in the close reading of the first sequence (xx and which is also mirrored in one particular action of the DFG) does also appear again on another level of narratology's interactional patterns. For the same reasons I will briefly refer to a book review on two narratological titles authored by a member of the Hamburg research group. My interest is that these explorative observations and thoughts – as insufficient as their methodological based may be – will raise attention to the possibilities of qualitative meta-research on projects of interdisciplinary philologies. This then would pose the question whether or not and in which ways there might, in fact, be an 'inability of the "Geisteswissenschaften" to become interdisciplinary' and how one could go about changing this.

Before I begin to present the close reading I would like to point out the conclusions which I eventually drew from it.

First, in spite of the desire to broaden its horizons, narratology today, having for the most part developed out of the (philological) study of literature, is still somewhat inclined to confine the scope of its object domain to aesthetic and/or textual artefacts and treat social and psychological aspects of narration as belonging to an area of research distinct from narratology proper.

Second, philological narratology appears to have a tendency to see itself as an *exporting discipline*, i.e. as a discipline for others to draw on, and does not reciprocate in the sense that it would give systematic consideration to the possibility of looking for useful *theoretical imports* from other disciplines concerned with narration.

Third, narratology, as appears to be true for the cultural und philological disciplines in general, does experience some deep-seated hesitations and resistance against engaging in *integrative* forms of interdisciplinary collaboration. One central theoretical notion to which this resistance seems to be bound is the traditional concept of the 'autonomy of art' which goes back to the advent of the bourgeois self-expression in art and literature of the 18th century and since then is often referred to in order to underline the – erroneous – assumption that artistic expression is 'free' in the sense of: free of any particular functions and implications regarding real worlds events and experiences.

Fourth, at the heart of this resistance against *integrative* forms of interdisciplinary collaboration is the fact that epistemologically the philologies/ literature studies overwhelmingly adhere to a strictly descriptive historical approach (focussing on literary motives, themes, on

intertextual references, history of ideas etc.). Most literary studies representatives even today regard it as inappropriate, improper, and/ or illegitimate to define their object domain as an interactional and psychological one. They hesitate to accept any explanatory approach which aims at pointing out and explaining the interactional and mental functions which literary/ aesthetic experience – as well as media interaction in general – may have for the participating individuals and groups.

Fifth, issues concerning interdisciplinary and multi-methodological research, the definition of disciplinary borders, and the disciplines' mechanism of border control do carry high emotional charges generating a potential of ambivalence and conflict. Therefore, these issues seem to not be as easily accessible to rational and critical discourse as is true for other less charged issues of scientific procedures. One factor that adds to the emotional and conflictual charge is that in recent years a broad consensus has developed throughout the sciences which regards interdisciplinary research as being of high methodological priority. This consensus, of course, is bound to get into conflict with the philologies' hesitation to adopt *integrative* forms of interdisciplinary approaches (which implies reciprocal theoretical exchange and multi-methodological settings, thus including the interactional/ psychological and explanatory dimension of the object domain).

Sixth, there are two forms of compensation formation which alleviate the task to deal with this conflict but also stifle its innovative potential; in fact, it permits the philologies to adopt an epistemological position in which one can be *ambivalently (anti-)interdisciplinary*, as I called it above. One way of doing so is to allow for an one-way exchange only, i.e. to be a science of theoretical export only (see point two above). The second is to practice interdisciplinary work not in an *integrative* but in a merely *additive* fashion. This for instance is the case when representatives from different academic fields focus on a common subject or theme and contribute independent articles to a reader. Thus the common theme is illuminated from different disciplinary angles; however, the particular object domains, theories and methodologies of the different disciplines do not interact, i.e. are not exchanged, reciprocally probed and combined to an integrative multi-methodological approach.

xxx 4. The close reading of an interactional sequence occurring on the conference.

The interactional sequence which I would like to focus on comprises approximately the last thirty minutes of the conference when the final paper and some general issues of interdisciplinary narratology were discussed. This final paper was read by Werner Wolf who spoke about the

narratological phenomenon of metalepsis, i.e. "the paradoxical transgression of ontological levels of representation" in a literary/ aesthetic narrative. Metalepsis basically means that the realm of the fictional events and characters paradoxically overlaps with the non-fictional realm of the author's producing the narrative. A metaleptic transgression occurs for instance when the protagonist of a novel marries its author or when the protagonist of a cartoon reaches out to the end of the page which he is printed on, picks up the page like a carpet in order to shove something under it (like in Werner Wolf's example as discussed later). Wolf presented an intriguing survey of various "transmedial" occurrences of metalepsis within literature, cartoon, and the visual arts referring, for example, to paintings/ drawings from René Magritte and M. C. Escher (see in Meister et al. [ed.] 2004 and www. xx).

The main theoretical purpose of the talk as defined in its subtitle ("A case study of the possibilities of 'exporting' narratological concepts") was to discus the "conditions" for the "fruitful export of narratological concepts into other disciplines".[8] Werner Wolf proposed four essential criteria for the interdisciplinary procedure of exporting a theoretical concept: (a) The "export-facilitating potential of the [narratological] phenomena under consideration". Here Wolf assumes differences along a scale reaching from phenomena "that are intrinsically related to the defining core of verbal storytelling" and "phenomena that are rather more transgeneric and transmedial" and which are characterised by having "only a loose or accidental connection with verbal narratives", as for instance is the case with metalepsis. (b) "A clear narratological conceptualization and description of typical features" of the phenomenon. (Wolf adds that "the lack of such clarity is often a deplorable reality in our discipline".) This theoretical conceptualisation "is a precondition of a meaningful export in which the exported concept remains recognizable" and "retains the maximum of the export potential it may have". (c) The "formal appropriateness of the narratological concept for the target phenomenon in the import domain"; there Wolf suggests that a notion of "high degree of similarity between a typical phenomenon in the export domain […] and the phenomenon in the import field" to which it is applied. However, Werner Wolf explicitly notes that, of course, concerning this similarity "opinions may differ as to where to draw the line for a conceptual export." Furthermore, he underlines that "some 'cognitive dissonance' and metaphoricity should be permitted, and […] the possibility of a deep-structural convergence should also be considered" when defining this similarity. (d) The "heuristic value of the exported notion for the use in the import field" which again also "depends on individual cases

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[8] The quotations are taken from the conference hand-out and the manuscript of the article; I own thanks to Werner Wolf for sending me his text before publication.

and interests". At any rate, "it certainly contributes to the heuristic value if no adequate term in the import domain has as yet been coined."

As to my immediate and entirely subjective listener reaction - which I intend to include into this explorative endeavour of (self-)reflexive meta-research: While hearing Werner Wolf's presentation I had the general impression that besides the theoretical issue at hand the paper also indirectly touched upon an underlying institutional issue which regards the definition of disciplinary borders. In my perception the talk seemed to also be motivated by the intention to take care that the concepts of narratology – meaning: philological/ literary narratology! – are not improperly used by disciplines other than the study of cultural and aesthetic phenomena. It appeared to me that there is an urge to define certain restrictions as to which disciplines may "fruitfully" import and apply concepts of (philological) narratology and for what purposes they are used. ggg My impression at this point of time was, of course, nothing more than a subjective and possibly entirely idiosyncratic perception on my part, an acting-out of a counter-transference reaction after having partaken in the two day conference. In any event, I wasn't at all sure whether I could trust myself; above all because I personally would tend to contest general definitions of disciplinary restrictions. Also I would have found such a move somewhat disappointing at the end of this conference during which I had strongly opted for a more far reaching integration of psychological (and psycho-traumatological) concepts of narration into philological studies. Hence, my perception might have just been something like a negative projection inspired by my own theoretical interests in expanding the scope of narratology's interdisciplinary exchange. (And with regard to the actual wording and intention of Werner Wolf's talk I later realized that my perception did have idiosyncratic aspects indeed!)

On the other hand, such a move of restricting narratology was quite understandable eventually. Without doubt, notions of 'the narrative' have become quite frequent throughout the sciences; and some of these notions may seem to lack a theoretically well-based definition of the term. This, of course, makes it more difficult to define the core of what (philological) narratology comprises and how it relates to various applications of the term 'narrative'. Also, as stated above, it is generally not surprising at all if issues of defining the scientific self, its disciplinary borders, and its object domain were affected by what Georges Devereux regarded as the subjective and anxiety-laden element in social research. The definition of self and/ versus other in principle is an emotionally charged issue in any field of human activity.

At any rate, I wasn't sure what to think of my thought about Werner Wolf's talk and, above all, I was not clear-minded enough myself at this point to raise this issue. In particular I felt I was

being unfair to the speaker. Werner Wolf in his very systematic argument in fact said nothing to the effect that fundamental restrictions were applied to exporting narratological concepts into other disciplines. Wolf spoke about the 'narrative' as not being restricted to verbal stories nor to narrative fiction, but extends to other genres and/or media as well, such as drama, the comic strip, film, or certain (series of) pictures. He underlined that narratology applies to fields outside 'high-brow' narrative fiction (within representations of possible worlds).

Therefore, by looking at the talk's manuscript I realized: if something other than my personal idiosyncrasies triggered associations about an underlying impulses to curb the interdisciplinary out-reach of narratology, this then mostly goes back to the two days of conference and/ or to narratology's institutional matrix rather than to Werner Wolf's talk. It wasn't before the discussant from the audience who spoke first after the talk recapitulated the papers main ideas that I gave any creed to my subjective reaction; because this discussant concluded (what Wolf had not explicitly stated): that the concept of metalepsis, while being a "transgeneric" and "transmedial" phenomenon within the realm of aesthetic/ fictional story telling, cannot be "fruitfully exported" to other object domains as to social and psychological sciences. Thus, it does seem that at this point in time of the conference's inter-narrational process Werner Wolf's paper had taken on the function of activating impulses of anti-interdisciplinary cautiousness which attempts to confine narratology's stretch into the "beyond" of literary studies and define narratology's core in a more narrow and philological sense.

I myself than entered the discussion and pointed out that there is a particular sort of mental phenomenon (and psychological concept) which, in fact, seems quite similar to the textual phenomenon of metalepsis, thus offering an opportunity to extend the conceptual thought about metalepsis beyond the sphere of aesthetic/ fictional story telling and also include issues of psychology: i.e. the mental phenomenon of *dissociation* – which is part of the psycho-pathological concepts of the *borderline syndrome* and the *multiple personality syndrome*. Dissociative processes (on the level of both intra-psychic and interpersonal communication/ narration) show some characteristics which immediately call to mind the main feature of metalepsis as pointed out by Werner Wolf: the paradoxical confusion between *(onto-)logically distinct worlds*. Therefore I proposed to rephrase the criterion as *(psycho-)logically distinct worlds* in order to pay heed to the fact that all narration, be it literary or of a different kind, is a psychological phenomenon.[9] In fact, the borderline syndrome's main characteristic is a psycho-affective process of splitting/

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[9] ggg Even in strictly philosophical terms one would have to concede - since Wittgenstein at latest - that thinking about the human condition does imply thinking about language which of course always also implies to think about the human psyche.

dissociation which prompts the person to spontaneously shift between two states of mind and world views, and these two views/ states of mind subjectively – and in particular affectively - feel not only like distinct but like absolutely irreconcilable worlds to the person: just like the aesthetic experience of metalepsis feels like (except that a person with borderline symptoms is not able to fully realize let alone aesthetically appreciate this experience of shift). Moreover, this process of splitting-up ones every day life experience into two or more *(psycho-)logically distinct worlds* is not merely a psychic and individual phenomenon. It may also turn into an interactional phenomenon - via *projective interaction mechanisms* (in particular on the basis of *projective identification*) – when the person is unconsciously acting-out the splitting in the context of relational (group-) dynamics by way of affect-transference.[10]

Along this line I pointed out to the conference participants that, contrary to what has been suggested, it seems that there is a psychological equivalent of (textual) metalepsis: mental *dissociation* and/or *borderline-splitting*. In order to illustrate my argument I referred to the image covering Rohde-Dachser's quintessential book on the borderline syndrome – which actually had prompted me to think about a correspondence of metalepsis and dissociation in the first place. This image shows a painting by surrealist painter René Magritte (of whom Wolf, too, had presented paintings as examples for visual metalepsis). The painting is called "Le Banquet" and shows a sun set in which the evening sun at the horizon paradoxically – and metaleptically – sets in front of a forest silhouette and not behind it. In choosing this metaleptic painting Rhode-Dachser, I though, must have had an intuition about the metaleptic nature of her main research topic: the mechanisms of mental dissociation and borderline-splitting. (Meanwhile I have realized that visual forms of metalepsis are used quite frequently in recent publications by authors from the more advanced fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy studies; these authors do include phenomena of dissociation into their studies which have long been regarded as being of psychotic nature and therefore beyond the scope of psychoanalysis.[11]) Since I had brought Rohde-Dachser's book with me I presented the image to the audience underlining my epistemological assumption that synoptically viewing the phenomena of metalepsis and dissociation and, thus, combining the

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[10] ggg Since a person affected by processes of borderline splitting is generally not psychotic/ schizophrenic s/he may interact with other in a quite intense and elaborate fashion; see Tschuschke (2001: 232p.), Rohde-Dachser (2000: 62p.) and Kernberg et al. (2000: 75pp).

[11] See for example Riedesser, the co-author of the first German psycho-traumatology handbook, in his article on triangulation, a therapeutic form of narrative interaction which solves the narrative arrest of the "(counter-) transference catastropy" (in: Bohleber/ Drews, 2001: 534pp.). Riedesser mentions Hofstadter's book on Escher, Gödel, and Bach and re-prints Escher's "Drawing hands". Mitchell (1988) in his book on object relation theory also uses this drawing.

object domains and theories of narratology and psychology/ psychotherapy studies is, in fact, possible and could be "fruitful" in terms of generating further insight into the mental and textual workings of the phenomena at hand.

At this point of the discussion something remarkable happened which at first was a bit shocking for me: After Werner Wolf explicitly appreciated my comment and expressed intent to look into literature on dissociation, a person from the audience who, in my recollection, had not spoken before during these two days, vigorously and angrily interjected her/himself. S/he said that s/he personally just does not like to deal with psychopathology and does not deem it helpful for narratological and literary studies either. S/he instead would like to see the concept of metalepsis be restricted to the sphere of *consciously committed* acts as is the case in aesthetic representations. (The person evidently understood acts of aesthetic expression to be entirely conscious.) Werner Wolf acknowledged the comment. No further reference was made to this issue. Shortly thereafter the discussion ended so that, in a sense, the persons vigorous comment came to be almost the 'last word' of the conference. –

ggg What had happened here? How can the sudden affective peak which characterized this intervention shortly before closing be accounted for (other than just taking it as the idiosyncratic outburst of an individual or as indication of general exhaustion and the like)? How can this utterance be understood co-narratively as expression of a significant interactional structure which pertains to (philological) narratology and/ or to the philologies in general and, thus, also guided the conference on the whole? Group-dynamically speaking such a sudden and blunt expression of anger by one member of the group/ audience is generally understood as an indication that some important issues of affect/ conflict – be it with regard to an epistemological, institutional or interpersonal issue – had been avoided, i.e. had not been openly and self-reflexively dealt with during these two days of conference. (This is especially true if the affective outburst isn't moderated and/ or rectified by other participants of the group.) Whatever the particular reasons might have been here, surely, the expressed affect of anger indicated an impulse of anti-interdisciplinary anxiety, even aggression; and the underlying personal and/or institutional conflict must have had something to do with 'psychopathology'/ psychology and its epistemological and/ or institutional meaning to the members of this conference.

What precisely was at stake here is hard to determine in retrospect having but insufficient documentation of the interactional sequence and not being able to gather more empiric materials (which could be done, for instance, by looking at other interactional sequences of the conference or by doing in-depth interviews with participants of this critical interaction). At least one thing

seems pretty clear: The actual effect which the angry intervention had on the discussion - which was some kind of shock effect: The audience appeared to be somewhat confused, maybe even stunned and embarrassed; there was no initiative to moderate the situation and clarify the questions at hand. Certainly I felt awkward in this moment, a bit guilt-ridden on the one hand because obviously I was the cause of this sudden flare-up of anti-psychological anger. On the other hand this outburst felt insulting to me, like a slap into the face of my argument and my scientific interests. Then again I thought maybe I gave the person reason to just be sickened by me personally since I yet another time entered the scene making yet another point in case for an interactional/ psychological narratology which, it has to be admitted, I frequently did during the two days.

ggg ggg At any rate, nobody in the room, myself included (!), seemed to have felt like touching upon this issue (ever) again and as a result the issue of 'psychopathology', and of interdisciplinary exchange with psychology in general did not come up any more. Maybe this is the guiding interactional principle that was at work in this quite complex group-dynamic scene of institutional interaction: the avoidance of scientific exchange with psychology.[12] ggg In this respect the person's intervention, as emotional and un-scientific as it might have been, was quite meaningful - and also quite successful: Almost like coming from a deus ex machina this theoretical restriction came down on us - issued, as it were, with a divine, 'genius-like' impatience - and imposed itself with sudden, unquestionable, and also somewhat uncanny force. (To drive this hypothesis even further: Given the high level of affect, it does not seem unlikely group-dynamically that most participants later on will have forgotten what this emotional outburst really was about. Such a temporary lack of memory is not untypical for moments of high affective charge. Unfortunately, however, this always has the effect that the outburst's implied epistemological restriction – vis-à-vis psychopathology - becomes all the more ingrained in the interactional/ co-narrational fabric of narratology.)

In retrospect it seems to me that maybe the general mind set of the conference participants in this moment, close to the end of two days of listening to talks proposing various options for an interdisciplinary expansion of narratology, might have been guided by an impulse to secure some basic rules and regulations limiting this expansion. It certainly would have felt somewhat

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[12] Such an avoidance does however have a price; it takes away opportunities to generate new insight. For example we missed out realizing that the proposed criterion of *consciousness* does not solve the problem at hand. Not only is aesthetic production in large parts unconscious, also *dissociation* may very well be consciously perceived by the person and yet not psychically integrated. In fact, full cognitive consciousness about the two conflicting worlds/ aspects is one of diagnostic prerequisites for dissociative personalities which are defined as not being able to suppress experience xx.

unsettling if we had parted without not even having attempted to circumscribe what narratology is and where its borderlines lie. (Plus, moments of closure and departure always are particularly sensitive and telling moments in every intellectual and emotional respect. Here, the content of Wolf's talk and the time slot it was put into converged.) Werner Wolf`s thoughts about the "conditions of fruitful export of narratological concepts into other disciplines", while they were highly systematic and precise, at this point in time could not possibly escape to also touch upon the affects which issues of defining self and other/"beyond" inevitably evoke - since this holds true for just any domain of social and institutional interaction. Without Werner Wolf nor anyone else having said anything to this effect explicitly on the level of the conference' *institutional unconscious* (see Mentzos in note xx) the general consensus might well have been: "Metalepsis and narrative concepts in general are 'transgeneric' within the field of cultural storytelling in the sense of textual/ mediated narration but not exportable into fields of social and psychological sciences – at least not in a 'fruitful' manner."

Thus it might have been a quite sensitive moment when I came in – insensitively, as it were – a quarter of an hour before closing and made my comment about *dissociation*, thus proposing yet another option for a possibly "fruitful" interdisciplinary reach-out; because in doing so I unwittingly thwarted the attempt – rather: the group-dynamic shift - to solidify the self-definition and delineation of the field of narratology. (What also might have increased the level of affect in this situation: As a matter of mere coincidence I was able to make my point quite convincingly since I could support it by a poignant image, a 'visual prove', as it were: If specialists of dissociative mental phenomena explicitly use metaleptic paintings and drawings as cover images of their publications the assumption that metalepsis and dissociation have something in common is not easily shrug off.) Morevoer, not only did I propose yet another interdisciplinary perspective but – even more and more threatening - in essence I proposed an option of *import* into narratology from outside. Because, since the (young) field of psychological study on mental dissociation represents a developed and methodologically differentiated research area, it certainly would have to be expected that it not only accepts input from literary and linguistic narratology but also generates new insight about aesthetic phenomena of metalepsis and, more generally, about fictional/ easthetic story telling in order to be *imported* by literary narratology.

Hence, the surprising emergence of an option of scientific *import* could have felt unsettling maybe even threatening to conference participants. The afore-mentioned (anti-)interdisciplinary anxieties, which already Devereux recognized as an inevitable and necessary ingredient of any project of interdisciplinary work, must have been at a high. They touched upon those affects

which regulate the relative sense of intellectual security and curiousness versus anxiety and methodological defense (against further reaching inquiry). This level of affects is not to be underrated in its interactional impact since while it regards the borders of the academic field of narratology it always also pertains to the highly sensitive question of who may assume the position of competency and expertise on a particular object domain (see Daniel Fulda xx beneath).

Almost inevitably, it seems to me in retrospect, this was the moment within this group-dynamic constellation for some one to come up (and maybe in particular for some one from the audience who has more leeway to follow her/is immediate reactions) and emphatically state: that s/he just doesn't like to proceed any further into the "beyond of literary theory" and above all not into 'psychopathology', and that she is angry that others attempt to do so. (Also: How possibly could one 'like' psychopathology?) At this point the internal conflict of *wanting and not wanting to go "beyond"* literary studies which each of us has to deal with (myself included; see my conference paper in Meister et al. [ed.][2004]) was acted out as an external conflict in the form of a sudden flare-up of aggressive affects. Thus, the closing sequence and its emotional out-burst represents a quite authentic moment which showed how difficult it really is – not only in intellectual but above all in affective respects – to venture into the area of interdisciplinary endeavors and how much we have to reckon with personal and institutional defense mechanisms.

Of course, as I said above, my observations and thoughts about this interactional sequence are methodologically insufficient by any standards of qualitative social research. Whether or not they reflect some of the interactional and institutional mechanisms of narratology and the philologies in general – one cannot really assert on such methodological and empirical basis. Presenting these observations here may at least serve the purpose to alert us to the option of engaging in forms of qualitative meta-research. Doing methodologically sound process studies on the interactional and mental dynamics which occur when the "Geisteswissenschaften" attempt to turn interdisciplinary would certainly have an impact on the quality of research of the future interdisciplinary philologies. What should be particularly intriguing for narratology, in any event, is the fact that this meta-research would be of a narratological kind since it would work with narratological methods, i.e. textual close readings and narrative interviews - individual and/ or group interviews which would be analyzed narratologically in order to reconstruct the guiding principals of the philologies' patterns of scientific interaction.

xxx 5. Donald Duck's meta-narrative experience: Excursion on textual metalepsis as aestheticized form of mental dissociation

Further sources of empirical materials pertinent to the qualitative/ co-narratological understanding of the interactional sequence always also lie in wider institutional and interactional context in which it occurred, like for instance the institutional interaction of the DFG which finances the Narratology Research Group in Hamburg and provides the scientific evaluation of its projects. Also, with any of such sequences it is its institutional context and pre-history as well as its aftermath which as a matter of principal might contain indicative interactional materials. ggg

To begin with, however, I would like to take note – in a brief excursion – of what could be perceived as a rather poetic aspect of the sequence as described above. It seems to me that there even is a correspondence, i.e. an interactional reverberation between the main subject matter of Werner Wolf's talk, metalepsis, and the conflict-ridden interaction about narratology's scope and borders. And this would indeed prove how complex human interaction and in particular group interaction/ (co-) narration is. The fact that it was the issue of metalepsis that triggered thoughts about the conditions of and possible restrictions to narratology's interdisciplinary out-reach seems less coincidental and/ or surprising if one takes into consideration that both issues are dealing with questions of delineating self and other and therefore unavoidably touch upon the anxieties that come with these issues. Metalepsis, as defined by Wolf, is about crossing the borders "of (onto-)logically [and/ or (psycho-)logically; H.W.] distinct worlds of representation"; and questions regarding the export of theoretical concepts are about crossing the borders of distinct scholarly disciplines.

One of the visual examples which Wolf presented in his talk unwittingly stressed the amount of anxiety that can be involved in issues of delineating self and other: namely Walt Disney's comic strip narrative of Donald Duck having a metaleptic nightmare. Donald dreams about a little alien coming from outer space eating up everything it finds on earth. In his dream Donald simply lifts one bottom corner of the page of paper which the comic strip is printed on and throws a bait underneath it so that the little voracious alien jumps after it, thus being expelled from the factual world of the cartoon narrative (see Werner Wolf`s text and illustration xx). This transgression of the border between two (onto-)logically and (psycho-)logically distinct worlds becomes all the more dramatic when the alien - on the following page - begins to nibble away the paper of the

comic strip page, thus eating up Donald's very space of existence. Then Donald is shown to awake from a nightmare screaming in panic; it becomes evident that the metaleptic interaction with the aliens was meant to be a dream. If one takes the scenario of this cartoon narration literally in its psycho-dynamic and affective implications for any wake experience it indeed reflects a most horrific state of mind equalling an anxiety attack as is known from moments of dissociative break down and pre-psychotic confusion (see Mentzos in Kernberg et al. 413ff.).

While this wonderfully meta-fictional cartoon is very funny it also indicates that metalepsis taken as the aesthetic expression of a psychic phenomenon refers to states of intense anxiety. This, of course, is less of a surprise if one takes into consideration that dissociation, which I suggested to regard as the psychological equivalent of metalepsis, sometimes results in high levels of anxiety and aggression (and, in any event, constitutes a defense mechanism against these intense and threatening affects). Therefore, one quintessential reason for the fascination which metalepsis stirs when being consumed as an aesthetically refined phenomenon may just be the fact that it is quite anxiety provoking when experienced as an un-aestheticized first hand psychic experience. In this respect, Donald Duck's anxiety dream, as quoted by Werner Wolf, might indeed prove to have intuitively grasped the core of what metalepsis is psychologically: the aesthetication of the frightening experience of a panic attack and more generally of moments of psychic disintegration. At the same time it becomes more conceivable how dealing with the seemingly well known narratological issue of metalepsis might also contribute to generating affective charges of anxiety (and reactive aggression). Maybe what also happened in the interactional sequence is that these two issues - metalepsis and the shifting of the disciplinary borders – were associated because they corresponded in affect (of fear and/or fascination). And since association is the central psycho-linguistc mechanism of art and poetry (also of psycho-therapy) this correspondence can be regarded as being a quasi-poetic aspect of this interaction.

At any rate, viewed from this angle it might become more understandable that dealing with the issues of metalepsis and scholarly border transgression in tandem at times may evoke a – truly Donaldian – nightmare that makes us nervous about and shy away from the, as it were, *inter-leptic leap* into other sciences. While nobody at this highly interdisciplinary conference consciously planned for this to happen, the mere issue of metalepsis, having been scheduled last on the agenda, may have come to stir up anti-interdisciplinary latencies and impulses of disciplinary border control. Yet, one thing can be learnt both from the studies about dissociation and from Donald Duck's nightmare: The ambivalent aspirations and anxieties about issues of interdisciplinary research will keep coming back to us haunting narratology and the "Geisteswissenschaften" in

general, just like the little alien in Donald Duck's nightmare keeps coming back eating up the cartoon's paper which Donald himself is printed on.

xxx 6. The interactional context of the sequence: Narratology as exporting science – and the German Science Foundation (DFG)

There are, however, some more concrete – and maybe less poetic - contextual indications as to the validity of my subjective observations about the interactional sequence discussed above. The first indication regards the conference itself and the choice of topics it presented. If one looks – before the backdrop of my reading of this sequence – at this interdisciplinary conference on "Narratology Beyond Literary Criticism" it seems striking that narratology – i.e. philological narratology - tends to conceive of itself as an *export science* only. While the conference papers gave illuminating applications of narratological concepts to various object domains other than literary texts or spoke about other scientific fields which also use notions of narration and the narrative, no paper attempted to import theoretical concepts and models from another discipline into narratology (except maybe for the paper I gave myself). The papers given by literary scholars applied narratology to aesthetic and/ or mediated phenomena (gospel and ancient biographical texts, classical music, exhibitions, illustrated texts [including visual images], visual arts, computer games, xx) The papers given by representatives of social sciences and psychology presented these fields' history of narratological approaches and terminologies. Theoretical papers proposed conceptual modifications or innovations in narratology (as for instance Alan Palmer's concepts of "mind of a fictional character" and the "continuing consciousness frame" which the reader of this "fictional mind" applies). However, the issue of possible theory imports was not touched upon at all - almost as if some Donaldian nightmare of metaleptic panic was to be expected. In this respect Werner Wolf's closing paper dealing with the "conditions" for the "fruitful export of narratological concepts into other disciplines" was fully authentic in not discussing import related questions of whether or not narratology in its present condition could actually import something from other sciences which are concerned with narration.

Here, a structural correspondence becomes visible: What at first, in the conference discussion had appeared in the form of a quite affect-laden conflict about whether or not 'psychopathology'/ psychology could be a worthwhile and "likable" part of narratology, here appears on a more abstract level as a phenomenon of institutional structure: the hesitation about scientific imports in combination with the aspiration to export and/ or apply the own field's

epistemological paradigms and concepts.[13] Curiously, it seems as if narratology while having developed out of a fringe position in-between different disciplines in the 1960s today aspires to not only become a respected field of study but reach a central epistemological position as guiding science ("Leitwissenschaft"). Form this guiding science then various fields may - under certain conditions - receive input while it at the same time does not allow its central theoretical paradigms to be complemented and/ or compromised by imports from other sciences.

xxx 7. The DFG's financial funding and scientific evaluation

Another contextual indication supporting the observations of my close reading regards an issue in the institutional pre-history of the conference and the Narratology Research Group; and it above all regards the DFG ('Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft') which provided the financial funding for the group. Surely, raising questions on this level basically implies asking for a whole set of analytical – and narratological - tools and procedures which lend itself to the complex task of institutional interaction analysis. This set of tools – as is used by institutional consultants and social researchers[14] - comprises in-depth individual and group interviewing about the communication and decision making processes of the institution (i.e. the DFG and the Hamburg Research Group). It aims at spurring a systematic process of institutional (self-)observation and (self-)evaluation. Of course, meta-research and process studies of this kind would necessitate a considerable methodological and institutional effort. And viewing an institution as complex as the DFG seems all the more challenging since the DFG relies on many outside referees which work in the academic field (mostly in Germany). Therefore, in a sense, the interactional and intellectual mechanisms of the whole field of German philologies are at stake. Without doubt, however, such research could be expected to lend valuable insight into the interactional patterns of the field's epistemological thinking and decision making – especially in areas of conflict; i.e. it would contribute to the success of the measures taken in order to support interdisciplinary research.

 Not being able to bank on any of these tools and draw from any further documentation, I can only note a general and not empirically reconfirmed observation about DFG funding polices and give two recent examples of projects of interdisciplinary work which have failed under the auspices of DFG-funding. Generally, the DFG, which since the early nineties has attached

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[13] Of course, any institutional psychologist, especially in the light of the above mentioned Donaldian nightmare would focus more on the affective dimension and wonder whether there maybe is an unarticulated *fear of imports* and which reasons and consequences it has

[14] Handbücher xx Tschuschke 42ff.

considerable importance to encouraging and supporting interdisciplinary projects, more recently made major funding decisions that seem to point into the opposite direction. This top-level institutional phenomenon has already been labelled with an inoffical designation: it is generally referred to as the "re-philologization" of the philologies (return to philological substance). However, no empirical work is available which could generate more insight into the workings and effects of "re-philologization". On the other hand, the general claim to intend buttress interdisciplinary approaches has not been abandoned at all with the DFG and the wider field of philological studies. On the contrary, interdisciplinarity of research as a principal strategic goal is still broadly accepted and adhered to at least on the level of programmatic claims. This aporatical situation, of course, makes it difficult to understand what representatives of the philologies and of the DFG really mean when they speak about interdisciplinary approaches. This inadvertently causes intense inner conflict with anyone who submits project proposals to the DFG.

Thus, it appears that an unarticulated conflict/ ambivalence about interdisciplinary research is at work already within the institutional fabric of the DFG (as well as within the circle of philological institutions in Germany from which the DFG draws outside referees). This institutional ambivalence on the part of the DFG must have had a particularly profound effect on our conference and especially on the participants who are members of the Hamburg research group. Because it so happened around the time of the conference that the DFG withdrew funding of all those projects of the group which were devoted to interdisciplinary questions. This affected fife out of nine projects! (The only interdisciplinary project which received continued assistance had been largely financed by the university of Hamburg itself.) Moreover, at the time the decision about the future of the group itself seemed pending. It is hardly feasible here to comment on this funding decision in terms of the scientific reasoning behind the particular project evaluations involved; this would require much more documentation and expertise than I can muster here. Suffice it to say that the justifications given were not able to convince the authors of the proposals and in some respects even seemed inconsistent and incoherent. (Malte??: Hier könnte man vielleicht einiges aus den Evaluationen Deines Projekts oder aus der DFG-Korrespondenz einbeziehen)

In a more abstract structural perspective of an interactional narratology which attempts to identify the guiding principles of co-narrational interaction formation and decision making in institutions it can be observed: One basic structural element of this top-level interaction already appears on the lower level in our interaction as participants of the conference group – the element of anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences: While our conference still struggled to discuss and develop

interdisciplinary approaches in narratology the interdisciplinary projects of the group, paradoxically, were cut funding by the DFG. At the same time, however, there already was a very strong and affect-laden voice among us saying aloud and uncontested that s/he just "does not like" to extend narratology's interdisciplinary scope to include fields of psychopathology/ psychology. It almost seems as if we ourselves had somehow actively helped to bring about the DFG's rejection of our interdisciplinary projects because we 'did not really like them' a lot.[15] Thus, anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences seem to be the common denominator of institutional interaction. Another related correspondence is the aspect of inconsistency which affected both the referees' statements and the interactional sequence as described above (see for instance the assumption that psychopathology is not applicable – and/or likable – as scientific resource for narratology because aesthetic representations and narratives stem from "consciously committed acts"). Logical or affective inconsistence is, of course, characteristic of any interactional constellation which is fraught by high levels of ambivalence.

Whatever the case might have been here exactly, the structural correspondence is evident. It seems that the Donaldian nightmare about the metaleptic experience of shifting and transgressing disciplinary borders has affected different institutional levels of narratology and of the philologies in general. And the aspect of anxiety seems to have outweighed the aspect of fascination, scientific curiosity, and methodological innovation.

xxx 8. Another Donaldian sequence: My correspondence with the editing committee

A third contextual indication pertaining to my close reading regards one instance of the conference's interactional aftermath: that is the interaction which unfolded between the editors of the conference reader and myself when I handed in my manuscript which contained both my talk and the close reading of the interaction sequence as given here above. And this interaction may well be taken as another facet of the above mentioned Donaldian nightmare about all too daring interdisciplinary and/ or metaleptic adventures. Therefore, I include it here as the second interactional sequence in point: As if I had asked for further evidence supporting my assumptions about the conference's anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences the editors, as it were, just 'did not like' my close reading, eventually declined to publish it (but appreciated my conference paper on

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[15] This is not to assume that a less cautious and more import-oriented approach towards interdisciplinarity on the grass-root level of narratological endeavors could have had any immediate influence on the top level actions – maybe even on the contrary. Within the administrative interaction and decision making procedures of the DFG (which in many respects is not as transparent as desirable) many factors and sub-institutions are involved; they are just too complex to lend themselves to speculations in any particular line of argument.

psycho-traumatological aspects of literary narration), and instead encouraged me to try offering it elsewhere for publication. I was quite taken by surprise. Of course, I was aware that any instigation to embark on steps of institutional self-reflection and / or meta-research will always also cause a certain amount of hesitation. Yet, I did not expect the organizers of a conference on interdisciplinary narratology to be very susceptible to such (anti-interdisciplinary) hesitations. After all narrative analysis of sequences of life interaction/ narration is common place in the narratological social sciences. (It, however, is not so well known within the hermeneutical disciplines of literary and philological studies.)

In any event, I also felt that not only the editors' decision itself but also the interactional process of its unfolding deserves some attention since it, once again, shows the amount of ambivalence as well as the affective charge that comes with these issues of interdisciplinary border transgression. (Here again I have to add the methodological remark that I have but insufficient documentation about the 'unfolding of the decision' since I can only refer to the correspondence I received and have no access to the internal interaction among the members of the editing committee let alone to in-depth interviewing of the members.) When the editors first commented on my manuscript a number of different and – to a certain amount: disjointed – reservations were articulated suggesting that a close reading of an interactional sequence which has actually occurred on the conference itself was problematic in scholarly and/ or ethical respects. It was, for example, stated that the reading "was formally inappropriate", that a certain "responsibility vis-à-vis the other participants" needs to be observed; that the close reading could be read as inappropriate attempt "to give an overall evaluation" of the conference; that the close reading is not in tune with the main part of my paper containing the talk which I present. (The apparent methodological deficiencies of my reading, as described above, were not mentioned.)

I was somewhat baffled by the heterogeneous array of the editor's remarks; and this confusion above all had the effect on me that I did not immediately realize that the editors eventually were not going to accept the close reading for publication under any circumstances. Also, one of the editor's reservations I very much shared myself – and I felt I could well defuse it: the concern that the (only) person who in my reading was identified by name, Werner Wolf, could possibly disagree with being involved in an meta-critical exploration of this kind. Narratological analyses in the social sciences are always anonymized as to the identity of the persons involved in the narrational materials. (And the methodological implications and ethical requirements of [meta-] research on narrative/ qualitative data is an vividly discussed issue in this field; see xx). This, of course, was not entirely possible in this case. For this reason I had early on corresponded with

Werner Wolf directly and had been glad to be assured that he not at all objected to my intention to analyze the conference interaction following his talk. (In fact, exchanging our manuscripts and discussing in some detail the pertinent issues proved to be very helpful and resulted in a number of changes in both of our papers.)

However, profoundly revising my paper in order to better observe some of the concerns that had been expressed and reassuring the editors that Werner Wolf does not object did not seem to be any effective in resolving the conflict. The correspondence about my manuscript increasingly turned out to not really be a very functional interaction in the sense that the correspondents shared a common understanding of what the questions at hand are and what the particular arguments imply. The more I tried to clarify what the essence of the editors reservations were and the more I changed my paper in order to better meet these reservations the more the editors (that is the majority of the editing committee) seemed to shift their focus – almost as if we did not speak the same language. In fact, the discussion faded out fast and it gradually became clear to me that the editors were adamant in their resolve. Also it increasingly appeared to me that the editors' objections against the close reading must be of a more fundamental and not truly rational nature – almost like matters of taste and aesthetic judgment which, of course, do not lend themselves to being rationally discussed.

So, after some correspondence and attempts to redo the paper (– unspoken ambivalences always cause much work one way or the other) I gave up my whish to have the close reading included in the conference reader and the editors and myself agreed that I instead add some general remarks about the "difficulties of becoming interdisciplinary". It still today remains unclear to me what it precisely was, in the editors' eyes, that made it appear so very unfeasible to include the close reading. However, the general line of thought and (inter-)action which the editors' decision corresponds with can be determined without much difficulty: Given the prior evidence as presented above it seems safe to assume what could not have been easily deduced on the basis of the editors' comments alone, that the main issue here, too, is an ambivalence about the interdisciplinary integration of psychological resources and qualitative methods into the philological study of literature, media and narration. But, paradoxically, the editors' did welcome my paper which follows a profoundly psychological approach. How come, then, that the close reading was perceived as being so absolutely unacceptable and how come that the correspondence about this issue turned out to be so entirely diffuse and dysfunctional? Does this micro-logical sequence of institutional interaction contain information about the patterns in which narratology and the "Geisteswissenschaften" (inter-)act when faced with interdisciplinary approaches?

Once again (self-)perception on the emotional level might be the most helpful tool: When I began to write about my correspondence with the editors I realized how difficult this particular part of the paper is for me emotionally. Repeatedly I had the feeling that I could not possibly include this aspect here. This was not because describing what happened was so difficult - or baffling, for that matter. (After all, interactions like this seem to be not so uncommon in the academic world.) It was because I felt as if the letters from the editors and the reasons given, as heterogeneous as they were, contained an implicit appeal to me to refrain from any further discussion and clarification and above all: to treat the whole issue with the utmost discretion. (Whether or not this was intended at all I, of course, don't know). This implicit appeal to keep quiet about all this I felt quite strongly. Also it felt like this appeal was charged with negative affects of anxiety, shame and hostility. The accompanying fantasies were about me being shunned by the philological community. Silly as it may seem, it felt as if no narratologist and/ or "Germanist" would ever talk to me again if I write about this conflict or about any other interaction of this kind, - as if I was about to violate an untouchable 'code of honors'. Even the more positive fantasies about colleagues who would support my point of view in scientific respects included these colleagues saying that, well, one should be noble, keep quite about such potentially embarrassing matters and move on into less complicated areas of academic correspondence. What added to the complication of the matter, looking at the accompanying affects of anxiety and shame more closely it – surprisingly – appeared to me that they are fueled by emotional sources distinctly more primordial, explosive and less accessible to consciousness's control than is the case with other more concrete and mundane worries of everyday professional life. (In other words: These affects/ transferences in my impression were of a rather dissociative quality with a relatively low degree of psychic integration). This concerned not only shame and anxiety but also the irritation and anger that I built up in reaction to this whole matter.

These emotional and associative reactions were, of course, highly idiosyncratic; they seemed silly. But this is how it felt. In any event, having the feeling that I am about to, as it were, break an unwritten and affectively charged law of academic conduct gave me some headache. Moreover, I realized that if I were to accept this law and not write about this issue I was – without necessity – acting precisely how the editors had coerced me to - namely: leave out a certain section of my paper which I felt was scientifically worthwhile and important to me as scholarly author. This though, of course, did not make the issue any easier emotionally. Because it seemed to suggest that I might be compelled, as it were, to perform an act of 'retroactive obedience' – thus 'internalizing the aggressor' (as Anna Freud had put it).

Also a number of other quite astute considerations did not help me much. For instance, I was well aware that such dysfunctional patterns of communication are not at all uncommon and do, in fact, frequently occur once the direct interaction is fraught by unarticulated ambivalences and conflicts. I also was aware that the psychic and interactional defense mechanisms which come along with ambivalences most often incur some amount of (narrative) omission, screen activities, and possibly even double-binding and power-play. (Such interaction patterns are studied in other scholarly fields as in social sciences and psychotherapy-research.). Furthermore I knew that these situations are never easy to deal with. Not only do they feel awkward when they actually occur. They are also not easily spoken about in retrospect. Plus, often times they have the tendency to escape memory because interactions which are affected by ambivalence, screening and double binding do not imprint themselves very clearly in the participants' memories and are easily forgotten (this is what made me assume that the anti-interdisciplinary out-burst at the conference might, as mentioned above, has been forgotten later on by many).[16]

Furthermore, I was aware that colleagues in areas like interaction counseling, supervision and psychotherapy-research are absolutely unwavering in their recommendation that if issues/ dynamics like this occur in a work setting they have to be addressed and 'worked through' as early and directly as possible unless all work processes, especially collaboration and communication, will take a big toll and the overall productivity of a project will decrease significantly. But why should I be the one to address these issues? Why always me, I thought. Because another thing which I knew perfectly well was: Whoever decides to invest her/himself in addressing ambivalent issues will encounter some amount of problems. Chances are that her/is perceptions will not be appreciated but regarded as erroneous and idiosyncratic (if not worse: as inappropriate, or tasteless, arrogant, embarrassing, and so forth). And chances are that the institution makes her/im the scapegoat for all sorts of institutional problems. This is why I hesitated a lot when trying to write about the correspondence with the editors.

Since I proceeded to do so anyhow I first had to ask myself: How could one approach this difficult task in a responsible and scientifically fruitful way (- other then just stating that I was unhappy about how the editors dealt with my paper). How could one take seriously the affects and associations which oneself or another participant of a particular interactional sequence

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[16] xx Research which micro-analytically describes human interaction can be found in the fields of qualitative social research (see for instance Rosenthal and Fischer-Rosenthal) and in psychotherapy-research (see Boothe, Buchholz, Streeck, for an overview see Bohleber/ Drews); the issue of ambivalence and double binding have been dealt with already by Bateson et al. more recently by Bauriedl and Maurer xx; the level of institutional interaction has been systematically described by Mentzos and has since been elaborated by a vastly increasing literature on group-dynamics, i.e. on process and team supervission.

experiences? As opposed to just saying that such associations and affects are silly and childish, can one maybe even use them as a heuristic tool? From resources of psycho-therapy research I had gathered that within this field it is generally suggested that such affective reactions are of course idiosyncratic and can even be called silly in the sense that they are subjective reactions which have to be curbed in the actual situation in order to keep the interaction functioning. But they may at the same time under certain methodological conditions serve as a helpful tool for understanding the interactional situation at hand. This approach is generally referred to as (counter-)transference analysis. Psycho-therapy research and – to a lesser degree - also qualitative social and/ or psychological research do use this tool (Drews xx Waldvogel). This means that the reactions of each participant of an interactional setting are taken as potentially reflecting a significant aspect of the interactional structures and the matrix of conflicts of this setting/ institution – in our case the structures of narratology and/ or in a wider perspective of interdisciplinary projects in the philologies in general.

This approach might indeed be quite insightful here, too. If the accompanying affects and associations which I had experienced also represent heuristically valuable (counter-)transference reactions which point towards significant interactional patterns of the institution/ group on the whole this then would mean: The above mentioned feelings of shame and anxiety – as well as the reactive anger about them – represent a significant interactional component of the conference's interactional matrix and most likely also of the philologies in general (especially when faced with the prospect of epistemological innovation, i.e. of interdisciplinary approaches). This indeed would be quite surprising because one would probably not have expected the emotional dimension to be of such importance. Above all, one would not have expected it to contain affects as shame and anxiety (which generally are situated on a rather primordial and latently dissociative level).

One specific hypothesis which I deduced from this thought and which I personally felt to be quite helpful for understanding what had happened there was the following: When the editors so adamantly rejected my close reading and when they were not able to communicate any coherent reasoning for the decision maybe they, too, on a subliminal level were faced with or anticipated similar feelings of shame, anxiety and anger in case they included a close reading like the one I submitted. Maybe the editors, too, had "silly" worries that no narratologist and/ or "Germanist" would ever talk to them again if they include this close-reading. This would at least explain why it seemed to be so very impossible to get clear on what the editors' concerns actually were and to discuss them in an explicit and rational manner. Also this would explain the paradoxical nature of

the (anti-)interdisciplinary dynamic on the whole because on this level of affect patterns of paradoxical (inter-)action are not uncommon but much rather the general rule.

In any event, focusing on the affective level would render more understandable another curious turn of events. For, the negotiation with the editors was not at all finished at this point. In particular, the agreement we reached seemed not to have settled the affective issues and we had to go through yet another sequence of affectively charged interaction – as if the infallible unconscious core of the conflict eventually came to the fore demanding its price for this strenuous process of conflict resolution: After I handed in my paper including some general remarks about the "difficulties of becoming interdisciplinary" (see Meister et al. [ed.] 2004) thinking that all issues are settled I received an answer the author of which seemed to have lost his temper. Suddenly, I found myself faced with the overt threat that my entire paper could possibly be denied publication. This moment seemed somewhat uncanny to me; also I felt that this utterance in affect and tone resembled the anti-interdisciplinary out-burst of the person in the conference audience (and meanwhile I think it indeed shares the same interactional structure). Once again I was quite taken by surprise, a bit embarrassed and guilt-ridden, as before, but also angered myself since I felt I don't deserve being threatened in this manner in particular since I had already agreed to all of the editors' demands. At least this is what I thought I did.

What had happened here, really? And in what way could even this last sequence reflect a significant element of the guiding interactional/ narrational structure of the institution of narratology and, more generally, of the philologies? As for my part, I had forgotten something, rather: I committed a Freudian slip! Did I just not think about changing this or did I not fully realize it as being one of the editors' requirements for revising the paper, or was it rather that unconsciously I did not want to give up all of what I originally wanted to write about? What ever the case might have been here, I did forget to omit the statement about the DFG. While I eliminated all references to the participants' talks and to the conference discussion one sensitive issue was still mentioned: the fact that the DFG cut funding of the interdisciplinary projects of the Hamburg Research Group shortly before the conference.

But why was the reaction to this so strong? (The option that it was guided by feelings of obligation vis-à-vis the sponsor institution, I think can be pretty much ruled out. The funding decisions of the DFG are public anyhow and the institution can be trusted to be well acquainted with and apt in dealing with criticism.) I think that the whole process of correspondence about my paper and its revisions must have been much more exhausting emotionally for all of us than we realized. The editors were engaged in justifying and enforcing their position on this very

ambivalent and affectively charged issue and since I did not immediately give in but implicitly questioned the reasons and proposed compromises the editors' task became even more tricky and ambiguous. The more I complied with the editors' objections the more it became evident that some pertinent reasons for the denial of publication had not yet been articulated or could not be articulated at all. This, of course, is an emotionally quite exhausting situation to be in for all participants.

Another interactional component might have played a role here; and this is where the DFG and the wider context of narratology does come in again. First of all the DFG's decision to cut funding in itself naturally must have put a high emotional toll on the Hamburg group. When fife out of nine projects are cut (and the decision about the future of the group itself seems pending) this will have consequences on the general mood set of any member of the group. Moreover, the following significant aspect should not be overlooked: The editors who I had such difficulties with after all were the ones to whom this very interdisciplinary conference is to be thanked to! Now, these editors consist of a group of younger members of the DFG-research group - 'young' also in the sense that they all did not yet hold permanent teaching posts thus being in an existentially insecure positions. The senior researchers of the group seemed to be much less involved in conceptualising this conference and/ or in editing the reader; thus, they seemed less involved in the impetus of trying to venture interdisciplinary pathways. (This at least was my subjective impression when dealing with the organization and following the discussion at the conference.)

If this observation was valid (which, of course, I cannot ascertain) it would not only support the above stated assumptions about a general institutional dynamic of unarticulated anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences. It would also mean that these ambivalences were acted out by interactional patterns which are polarized in age-specific or rather generation-specific ways. And if there are in fact generation-specific patterns of dealing with – rather: covering up - unarticulated ambivalences in an institution then the processes of the institution's self-recruiting will be massively affected by these ambivalences, too; i.e. the distribution of jobs and existential security comes onto the interactional scene. The question which emerges here is: To what extent is it subjectively felt by candidates for academic positions to be a tacit prerequisite for acquiring a tenured position in the "Geisteswissenschaften" to successfully participate in the specific interactional patterns of dealing with and/ or covering-up the institution's ambivalences about methodology and object domain, in simpler words: to successfully act (*anti*)-*interdisciplinary* as defined above? This aspect is even more prevalent in Germany since there – as has been deplored for decades now – the passage to tenured positions occurs relatively late in life, on average after

the age of forty.[17] This, of course, makes comprehensible how these issues could become so explosive emotionally in particular among younger representatives of the field who do not hold permanent positions yet and possibly feel that they should try hard to fulfil any professional requirements for such a position – both the formal and the more informal, unspoken requirements.

Thus, it seems that in the correspondence between the editors and myself the interactional dynamics of different institutional levels of narratology and of the German "Geisteswissenschaften" may have overlapped – as is generally the case in complex interactional settings (especially if there are un-articulated ambivalences and unresolved institutional conflicts). And as a result these ambivalences have multiplied and escalated in terms of their emotional and interactional effects: The DFG in these days of "Rephilologisierung" had been giving mixed signals as to what it actually wants and what it means when it claims to support interdisciplinary approaches. The research group itself seemed ambivalent about issues of interdisciplinarity, too, and possibly even along generational lines. In the midst of this – rather: on a lower level of institutional authority – a group of younger representatives who do not hold tenured positions yet decide to make an extra effort to advance interdisciplinary approaches. They lobby for and eventually organize an conference on interdisciplinary narratology. And after this conference I come along and confront the editors with an aspect of interdisciplinary methodology which is entirely unprecedented in the philologies. A constellation like this in terms of affect and group-dynamics might become quite explosive, indeed. It contains an emotional/ institutional burden which is certainly big enough to make anyone lose her/is temper at certain points of the process.

Moreover, what generally happens if an institution is based on an interactional matrix fraught with unarticulated ambivalences and unresolved conflicts is not only that these ambivalences are repeatedly 'acted out' in specific interactional patterns ('acting out' understood to be the opposite of acknowledging and/ or resolving ambivalences and conflicts[18]); but also that this 'acting out' takes place on the institution's lower levels of authority and influence (see Mentzos xx). In a sense the lower level representatives always have to reckon with being dragged into the quite difficult position of unconsciously acting-out the unresolved conflicts which the upper levels (like the DFG) have failed to acknowledge and work on. This is I think what had happened to us. Clearly, all of us belong to the institution's lower levels. Neither the editors nor myself are holding a permanent teaching position. (Also the person from the audience who angrily

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[17] Another factor which aggravates this matter is that in Germany there are hardly any out-side influences that could help modify these patterns of self-recruitment along the institution's traditional procedures. Formal procedures of quality control, student evaluations, and institutional ratings are just about to be developed and it will still take some time before they are widely recognized.

[18] For the concepts of acting out see xx for concepts of "interactional matrix" see xx.

interjected that s/he does not like psychopathology, was a young person.) Moreover, the conflict we got into, looking at it more closely, was a quite peculiar and even a paradoxical conflict for us to be in. Why would a group of aspiring junior scholars each of whom is engaged in attempting to advance interdisciplinary approaches in narratology get into fundamental conflicts about becoming interdisciplinary? Why would these conflicts be of such an irrational and intense kind - if not they are acting out unacknowledged and unresolved institutional ambivalences which have been handed down, i.e. transferred, by upper levels of the institutional matrix, i.e. the DFG, their "geisteswissenschaftliche" referees and possibly even the tenured representatives of narratology?

This constellation of an institutionally ingrained ambivalence is a quite complex matter, indeed. It is a rather sad matter, too; and this it is in more than one respect. To begin with, the matter is sad in the most profound sense of the psychoanalytical concepts of sadness: since where ever affects of shame and anger come up out of the blue and are not immediately traceable to particular circumstances some issues and experiences of a psycho-traumatological importance have not been integrated mentally and emotionally to the point that sadness occurs (about having been hurt or deprived). Therefore, the interactional dynamic at hand is sad in that it does, indeed, refer to a psycho-traumatic issue (what ever this issue might be here personally and institutionally is another question), and the dynamic turned into irritation and annoyance because the underlying issues have not been mourned and clarified but transferred (inter-generationally). Sad this matter is, too, in a less elaborate sense: because it simply seems inappropriate and unfair to burden the younger generation on the lower institutional levels with conflicts that should have better been tackled or at least acknowledged by the senior levels, especially if this burden tends to suffocate innovative interdisciplinary work. (Here institutional consulters often use the comparison with maladjusted parents of adolescent children.) Sad this matter is eventually, and this goes without saying, in the most generic sense of the word because interactional structures of this kind are not very conducive to scientific endeavors and will reduce the over-all productivity of any research project.

xxx 9. *Semi-interdisciplinary* research as compensation formation for unresolved ambivalences about approaches of integrative interdisciplinary

The assumption that there might be a structure of deep-seated and un-acknowledged ambivalences in the institutional matrix of philologies/ "Geisteswissenschaften" (some psychoanalysts would

call it an unconscious and/ or split-off ambivalence) also helps us to better understand what I have earlier called an *additive* mode of interdisciplinary approaches as opposed to an *integrative* mode. Looking at examples of this additive mode more closely one realizes that it mostly comes down to a semi-interdisciplinary procedure which only allows for theoretical exports and/ or for unreciprocated applications of ones own theoretical paradigms to the object domains of other fields. The interactional logic of this kind of research procedure is a logic of 'application-to' rather than 'exchange-with'. This for instance is the case when an interdisciplinary approaches is defined as taking the narratological concepts and 'apply them to' other domains which 'have not yet been treated narratologically'. While the object domain (in this case the domain of philological narratology) is expanded this mode of interdisciplinary work does not include the assimilation of theories and methodologies from other fields concerned with human narration (as pointed out above in discussing Werner Wolf's paper xx). What I would like to underline here is that this mode of semi-interdisciplinary research may quite effectively function as compensation formation for un-acknowledged ambivalences about interdisciplinary approaches. Since it allows for being at the same time *interdisciplinary* and *anti-interdisciplinary*. Thus, it may well moderate and appease the ambivalences and the attached affective charge without proceeding towards real conflict solution.

    Such moderation and appeasement is very much in need in the present situation. For, what makes the issues of interdisciplinary approaches even more intricate: Admitting and discussing more candidly that there might be some deep-seated reservations against interdisciplinary approaches – especially against explanatory, psychological approaches - on the part of the "Geisteswissenschaften" would indeed not be a very easy thing to do these days. Because today practically every body formally agrees that interdisciplinary work is mandatory and inescapable for contemporary humanities. The goal to further develop interdisciplinary concepts and support multi-methodological projects is generally adhered to without question by any philological field, the DFG, and the major research funding foundations – at least in principal. Therefore, nobody who is part of the academic life of the "Geisteswissenschaften" is very likely to come right out and say aloud that in some ways s/he "just doesn't like" to engage in and/ or to support interdisciplinary work or that s/he, at any rate, is not sure how this could be done in productive ways. (And of course there are many intelligent ways to express such reservations by clothing them in more abstract epistemological considerations.) Also the above mentioned fact that the DFG in these days of "re-philologization" gives conflicting signals about interdisciplinary research complicates matters since what happens on the top institutional levels always multiplies

and escalates on the institutional levels below. Thus, issues of interdisciplinary epistemology in the "Geisteswissenschaften" seem to have reached some sort of communicational deadlock in which several mechanisms of compensation formation and screen activity cover up the very fact that there might be a more fundamental procedural and institutional problem with the philologies' interdisciplinary relations.

xxx 10. You ought not shift the areas of scientific authorization ('disziplinäre Zuständigkeitsbereiche')

As far as narratology and the Hamburg conference is concerned, there is another case in point that suggests that a representative from the lower institutional level of narratology unwittingly acted out in defense of anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences. Here the privileged target of this acting out once again was: psychology.[19] How deep-seated and irrational the reservations are which narratology and/ or the philologies harbor vis-à-vis psychological approaches is poignantly revealed in a book review written by Daniel Fulda who is affiliated with the Hamburg research group. On the conference Fulda gave an insightful narratological analysis about a widely recognized and controversial historical exhibition (*Die Wehrmachtsausstellung*; see above). Thus he went far beyond the borders of what usually is regarded the business of his discipline, "Germanistik" (the study of German literature). Yet, when reviewing two recent titles on interdisciplinary narratology (by Nünning/ Nünning, 2002a, 2002b) and commenting on the contributions from psychological narratology Fulda expresses two reservations – and he does so with particular emphasis (saying in parenthesis that he - "the reviewer" i.e. Fulda - wants to "specifically underscore [these reservations] in spite of the general innovative enthusiasm which drives most contributors [of the reader]"). The first reservation surprisingly is not an epistemological but a formal one. It states that the psychological approaches to and the "cognitive models of narration cause a shift in areas of scientific authorization and competence ('disziplinärer Zuständigkeitsbereich')" and that, therefore, "philological narratologists" are deprived of their position to aptly evaluate their object domain. Fulda does not seem to realize that his argument is

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[19] There is a great abundance of evidence historically that the interdisciplinary interaction with the fields of psychology/ psychoanalysis has been difficult and conflict-laden not only for narratology but for the "Geisteswissenschaften"/ philolgies in general. To be sure, there still is an important chapter of the history of philologies to be written on this issue. And it would certainly include a chapter about how some schools of psychoanalytic study of literary and cultural phenomena have been missing a methodologically sound approach and even more: have come across rather esoteric und un-scientific so that the plain and sometimes even obstinate rejection of psychological approaches is, in part, historically understandable – however in the end not acceptable.

not really of a scientific but of a purely formal and institutional nature. It implies that keeping the existing order of scholarly authorization and competency ('disziplinärer Zuständigkeitsbereich') has epistemological priority before the option of rearranging it to render it more effective in meeting contemporary scientific challenges. Above all Fulda seems to underestimate the amount of psychological competency that can be gained by non-psychologists as for instance philologists, and by doing so he also underestimates the potential of the academic initiative he himself is invested in: cross-disciplinary collaboration.

Fulda's second point of critique is meant to buttress the first one. When commenting Strasen's paper (in Nünning/ Nünning 2002b xx) Fulda states that "inner-psychic processes are not observable" and therefore constitute a "meta-theoretical black-box" ('theoriearchitektonische Blackbox') within psychology and other related sciences; this, Fulda implies, is problematic in theoretical and above all in methodological respects. Now, while this statement is not entirely correct since inner-psychic processes do produce empirical evidence (in individual behavior and personal [self-]expression, and last not least according to parameters of neuro-physiological measurements), the methodological challenge which Fulda rightly points out is best met by the so-called qualitative methods of sociological and psychological narratology (see Rosenthal, Deppermann, Boothe, Flick xx). But it is precisely these methods that the narratological reviewer at the same time emphatically questions in their scientific validity. Also Fulda's argument is curiously positivistic as coming from a literary scholar – as if the essence of art and literature was so very "observable", and as if the 'meaning' that we literary scholars generally confer on it when interpreting hermeneutically could be confirmed by "observable" facts.

It is precisely for its less rational aspects that I find Fulda's emphatic critique most remarkable. I think it shows in a nutshell the workings of the philologies' anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences vis-à-vis psychology; it also shows how these ambivalences really reflect the philologies' own methodological problems in hermeneutical interpretation. Since, what Fulda certainly did not mean to say but what some of the connotations of his argument nonetheless unwittingly suggest: first, psychology is unjustly taking away our philological object domain from us (our "scientific authorization and competence" is curtailed), and second, on top of this psychology in a way does not really exist at all or at least is not a legitimate scientific resource because its object domain "cannot be observed" – that is it cannot be looked at like a text. So, on the level of his connotative subtext Fulda, too, in a way said that he 'just does not like psychology'. The facts that Fulda's project was one of those which were cut funding by the DFG

and that Fulda, too, does not yet hold a permanent position lends a paradoxical and maybe even tragic touch to this little vignette of philologies' anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences.

xxx 11. Keeping the "interpretation monopoly" in the Geisteswissenschaften

Fuldas complaint about the inadmissible shifting of areas of disciplinary authorisation ('disziplinäre Zuständigkeitsbereiche')" is not at all an isolated phenomenon. It appears, in fact, quite currently in the philologies and is generally used to define what is regarded legitimate versus illegitimate philological research. Within the quite limited scope of information which I personally have access to there is one further case in which this specific complaint – notwithstanding its entirely un-scientific nature – played a crucial role in the evaluation and subsequent rejection of an inter-disciplinary research project in the philologies. This case regards another major research-funding foundation in Germany. This foundation has shown an exceptional engagement in attempting to foster interdisciplinary research also in the philologies/ "Geisteswissenschaften".

Naturally, in this case, too, any profound study of the processes of decision making in funding philological research would have to overcome the problem of insufficient documentation. With this foundation the applicants do not receive any written comment on their project other than the notification about whether the proposal is accepted or not. Information pertinent to this question is not publicly available. That I am able to contribute some minimal amount of information about this project and its fate in the evaluation is, once again, due to the coincidental fact that I am personally acquainted with the authors of the project and had the opportunity to see the proposal in its various stages of consultation and preparation. Moreover, all information about the referee's statements of evaluation given to me by the authors they themselves only received in informal conversations with the foundation's administrators. This means that here, too, and even more so than in the case with the DFG-project (since here we don't even have any written and official statements at hand) I am painfully aware of the methodological deficiencies I incur in presenting this case here. A sufficient documentation and analysis about this particular project of research-funding decision would, it needs to be underscored again, necessitate a full-fletch methodological apparatus of qualitative meta-research and process study and, thus, implies a considerable institutional effort. Not being able to bank on such institutional effort I am confined to present this case on the basis of oral reports only.

The proposed project touches upon some of the issues which I dealt with above in that it, too, chose to not only follow an interdisciplinary (or semi-interdisciplinary) approach but

also opted to fully include resources of psychology – also psychopathology – and qualitative-sociology into its research on a literary and/ or aesthetic object domain; plus it formulates not only descriptive but explanatory questions about the interactional functions inherent to pieces of art, literature, and media.

The project team assumed that reading/ viewing narrative (fictional and non-fictional) texts and films which deal with psycho-traumatic experiences of conflict and violence does have certain psychological and biographical functions for the readers/ viewers. Text and media interaction was, thus, viewed as having a pivotal influence on the person's dealing with psycho-traumatic experiences in her or his own life history. The project chose a twofold object of study: (1) empirical material from different individuals' text and media interaction as well as from the interaction in psycho-therapy settings and (2) the cultural manifestations themselves, i.e. texts, films, art, fictional and documentary media products which contain trauma narratives or can be perceived as aesthetic expressions of psycho-traumatic experiences. The project's main question was: In what ways does aesthetic and media interaction contribute to the therapeutic working through versus the screening-off of personal experience of psycho-traumatic relevance. The project aimed to advance basic narratological and qualitative research in culture and media studies as well as therapy studies; it also aimed to contribute to the understanding of cultural phenomena and their subjective reception by readers and media users. In addition, it was intended to spur further research on possible implementations in culture-pedagogy and social work. Theoretically and with regard to the object domain the project planed to draw from three academic fields: qualitative social sciences, qualitative psychology/ psycho-traumatology and the humanities/ philologies.

The foundation's program seemed most adequate for projects like this; because it dedicated one of their key initiatives to formulate key-concepts of the "Geisteswissenschaften" in an interdisciplinary manner and support research teams and topics which promise to do successful work to this effect. (xx Quote www.) Moreover, this foundation is unparalleled in its engagement to consult and prepare promising teams in formulating the proposal in the clearest and most conducive way possible in order to fare well in the subsequent evaluation. The project team re-wrote its proposal several times and met with foundation representatives twice in the course of year before the proposal was formally handed in. The evaluation procedure itself is most elaborate and works with different steps of reviewing by external referees from the pertaining academic fields.

Knowing that the foundation addresses the most competent referees from all scientific fields pertaining to the project and also being fully aware that the project proposed an innovative approach in methodological and theoretical respects (regarding the amalgamation of social sciences and philological methods and the psycho-traumatological focus) the team was hopeful that the general anti-interdisciplinary climate in these days of re-philologization didn't affect this foundation so that a truly scientific evaluation by expert referees from different fields was to be expected. All the more surprising it was that, given the oral summary of the referees evaluations, the project's inter-disciplinary methodological approach was not acknowledged at all let alone commented on in any specific ways. The evaluation statements given to the team without exception expressed philological concerns only. One statement held that the project wasn't really a philological one in that "the interpretation monopoly is handed over to psycho-traumatology and the 'Geisteswissenschaften' only has the status of a 'assisting science' ('Hilfswissenschaft')" – the implication being that this is not adequate for a program in philologies.

Similar to Fulda's suggestion that shifting the "disziplinäre Zuständigkeitsbereiche" constitutes a problem this statement of evaluation executed the rule that one ought not shift the areas of scientific authorization ('disziplinäre Zuständigkeitsbereiche') in the "Geisteswissenschaften". Aside of the fact that the team did not feel that this statement is correct and adequately describes the proposals approach, already the choice of words – "monopoly", assisting science'/ "Hilfswissenschaft" – indicates that the underlying concern is focussing on institutional issues rather then scientific quality. A "monopolists" mind set cannot really be inter-disciplinary, in principal; it will at best try to appear as being interdisciplinary for strategic reasons (for example by supporting semi-interdisciplinary perspectives) while remaining preoccupied with questions of managing the "interpretation monopoly".

Another statement of the referees held that "the project does not take into account the specifically aesthetic status of its object domain". This probably is the most frequently used argument to fend off interdisciplinary approaches in the philologies. People who are engaged in interdisciplinary approaches have heard this argument in many different variations. Basically, wondering about the "specifically aesthetic status" of a piece of art or documentation represents a highly intriguing question. (In fact, the project team proposed to deal with this very question in terms of the therapeutic functions which a text by its very content and form might support and/ or weaken. One of the "guiding questions" of the project was: "To what extent and in which ways does the aesthetic narrative in its content and form offer its readers opportunities to psychically integrate personal and/ or historically mediated experience, which the text addresses

and/or the reader her-/himself subjectively associates?") However, in order to understand this argument adequately one does have to know – and this I can only state here without being able to present narrative material which proves my assumption – what is actually meant when philologist speak about "taking into account the specifically aesthetic status of art". In general, when ever this phrase comes up in certain moments of an academic discussion it means that the person insists on thinking and writing about an artistic and/ or textual phenomenon 'aesthetically', i.e. to think about it as if these phenomenon did not have any correspondence with real world phenomena. The aesthetic phenomenon possesses the 'aesthetic autonomy' (in the sense I defined it above); it is viewed to be autonomous of any implications of reality or rather the – quite evident correspondences to the real world are acknowledged but they are deemed irrelevant to doing research about the aesthetic objects. Methodologically speaking this means that if one deals with novels and films about life and love, sex and crime et cetera the philologist focussing the "aesthetic status" of these novels and films would decidedly refrain from turning toward the sciences which deal with the real world equivalents of life and love, sex and crime et cetera i.e. they reject the option to consult psychology and other (inter-)actional and explanatory sciences.

Aside of these two central statements the evaluation mentioned a number of smaller complaints, for example, regarding definitions and certain scholarly titles which have not been quoted in the proposal. (The team – in a twenty page summary of relevant research resources focussed on psychological and sociological definitions of trauma and narration and maybe did not mention all philological work on 'narration'.)

Over all, in seems that this project of inter-disciplinary cultural studies did not receive proper scientific evaluation although the foundation's representatives and consultants put great effort into assisting the writing of the proposal. In retrospect, it seems that the project did not have a chance at all because of the deeply ingrained anti-interdisciplinary ambivalences which affect the philologies during these times of re-philologication.

xxx 12. Another mechanism of compensation formation: *Reductive appropriation* of scientific concepts by the "Geisteswissenschaften". The example of *philological trauma studies*

In my perception there is another form of compensation formation developed by the philologies to cover-up profound hesitations about engaging in integrative modes of interdisciplinary work.

There seems to be an institutional mechanism which I would propose to term *reductive appropriation.* This mechanism prompts representatives of the "Geisteswissenschaften" to assimilate and/ or reinvent isolated scientific concepts and theories from other scholarly fields (when ever they are confronted with them, be it by personal and/ or public interest). The overriding goal of this kind of appropriative reinvention is to assimilate (and reduce) the scope of these concepts in a way which makes them more applicable for philological purposes in the sense that they do not challenge the traditional approaches to philological text-interpretation as well as the traditional assumptions about the 'meaning' of certain texts. Tellingly, the German term "Interpretationsgewohnheiten" (the customary reading of a text) has been coined for quite some time. Sometimes this specifically assimilated concept is even turned against the core defining criteria of the original concept; and it is then delineated against the original concept as defined by its former home discipline outside the "Geisteswissenschaften" and – whenever necessary - defended as being the true definition of the concept and it is strictly.

A recent example of this mechanism of *reductive appropriation* is the re-invention of *clinical psycho-traumatology* as *literary trauma studies* by the philologies. The writing of this chapter of the history of philologies' interdisciplinary activities could, I think, also serve well to demonstrate the degree of intellectual willfulness which may be mobilized by *reductive appropriation*. For, significant parts of literary trauma studies while using notions of psycho-trauma at the same time succeeded in neglecting the most basic findings of clinical psycho-traumatology and stating the plain opposite in order to better comply with fundamental assumptions (and "Interpretationsgewohnheiten") of philological text-exegesis.[20] Here I can give just a view references: Manfred Weinberg, member of the DFG-research-focus *Literatur and Anthropology* in Konstanz ("Sonderforschungsbereich *Literatur und Anthropologie*") in 1999 stated that "whatever has been forgotten as a result of psycho-trauma" in fact is "adequately preserved". Weinberg then added that whoever ventures "to remember which has been forgotten […] transforms it into conscious recollection" which, he affirms, is "an inadequate form of [psychic] representation" of a traumatic experience; s/he, thus, falls guilty of "ex-corporating the trauma" (205-6). Furthermore, as an essential(-ist) assumption Weinberg states that "psycho-trauma is always already imprinted into memory". While it is philosophically assumed that there is no memory outside of "Trauma" and that "Trauma" is a fundamental and ontological prerequisite of human memory and the human condition, "Trauma" does not really refer to any

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[20] See Mahler-Bungers xx and Weilnböck (2001a, 2005c).

specific psycho-traumatic experience.[21] Thus, philological trauma studies are transposed into a realm which is entirely beyond the consideration of specific psycho-traumatic events/ experiences of individuals who are engaged in writing and reading about trauma in narrative and/ or aesthetic form. (For further examples and critical discussion see Mahler-Bungers xx and Weilnböck 2001a, 2005c).[22]

What is most important to our question, however, is: If one looks for the central strategic interest which is implicit to the paradoxical epistemological approach of Weinberg (and many others) one finds this interest to be of a quite philological nature: to support a high epistemological appreciation of literature/ art and to restrict the privileged scientific authority to the philologies and their hermeneutical approach of literature/ art interpretation – as opposed to other scholarly fields as social science and psychology. This becomes particularly apparent when Weinberg in the last sentence of his article emphasizes that it is only "literature [which] contains the potential to perform the inter-play of trauma and remembrance". Already "philosophy and historiography" as opposed to literature and art studies do not contain this potential and, thus, "always already" participate in rendering oblivious the fact that "any recollection is based on trauma".[23] These statements implicitly disqualify the other sciences (and interdisciplinary approaches in general) while they at the same time reserve the status of methodological adequacy for the philological/ hermeneutical fields.

xxx 13. Poststructural and/or traditional psychoanalysis as vehicle of philological "Interpretationsgewohnheiten" (interpretation habits)

In stating these philosophical considerations Weinberg does not at all express a singular and idiosyncratic notion of trauma but in fact represents a line of thought which is quite typical for

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[21] "Das Trauma ist dem Gedächtnis immer schon eingeschrieben […]; doch muss es gerade deshalb unverfügbar bleiben" (ebd. S. 206). Das „im Trauma Vergessene" ist das „adäquat Bewahrte". Dieses „Vergessene" dennoch erinnern zu wollen, bedeutet, sich einer „Exkorporation des Traumas" schuldig zu machen, die eine „Überführung" des Traumas „in die inadäquate (sic) Repräsentation bewussten Erinnerns" zur Folge hätte (ebd.).

[22] For examples of a systematic and scientifically fruitful collaboration of psycho-traumatology and culture studies see for instance Pietzcker Fischer xx, the Freiburger literaturpsychologische Gespräche/ Jahrbuch Literatur und Psychoanalyse, Fraisl/ Stromberger (2004), Weilnböck xx Lanzm; for an overview see Weilnböck (2001a, 2005c)

[23] None of Weinberg's eighty three footnotes refer to clinical psycho-traumatology (except for Laplanche/ Pontalis who he fundamentally disagrees with regarding the question whether the study of trauma should also be about asking how trauma can be "healed" 173) – many footnotes, however, refer to poststructural psychoanalysis. Given that Weinberg considers "conscious recollection" as "inadequate form of [psychic] representation" it can safely be assumed that in spite of his referring to certain authors of psychoanalysis he would also include all psychology and psychotherapy research into these other fields which lack the "potential to perform the inter-play of trauma and remembrance".

substantial parts of philological trauma studies. Above all Weinberg is deeply indebted to poststructuralist authors, here in particular to Derrida, F. Kittler and to Haverkamp's notion of the "anagrammatic latency of the trauma" in the literary text; he also refers to Caruth's influential notion of the "inaccessibility" of trauma "to conscious recall" (176, in Caruth 151). Caruth's cultural studies approach to trauma furthermore includes the notion that "the trauma", at any rate, should be "sanctified" and that "narrative remembrance" endangers this sanctification and entails some kind of loss.[24] This approach has been and still is very influential in literature studies. This is all the more significant - and deplorable - since Weinberg and comparable philological authors do not only ignore clinical studies of psycho-traumatology but in fact often argue in a rather un-scientific manner and, what is more worrying, in doing so display anti-enlightenment leanings. (These, of course, are immanent to many of poststructuralism's concepts in general.) For, who ever opts for sanctifying issues of human experience and at the same time principally questions the value of "narrative recollection" and analysis in fact does take a stance which is opposed to science and enlightenment; s/he in effect approaches the realm of (quasi-)religious beliefs.[25] In this respect Caruth's statement that "the trauma [should be] sanctified" is to be taken quite literally. It indicates a (quasi-)religious attachment to theoretical concepts.

Such a (quasi-)religious and highly affective attachment to theoretical concepts and philosophical ideas certainly is characteristic of literary trauma studies but – in maybe less apparent ways – also seems to pertain to the more conventional approaches of literature studies in the philological/ philosophical tradition. Based on Caruth's theory the author-scholar xx Sebald who has become a most renowned representative of trauma-literature about the post World War II bombings of German cities (xx prüfen!) vigorously considers any kind of narrative remembrance of trauma as inappropriate and, even more, as illegitimate. And this is where the intellectual and emotional impulse to *sanctify* scientific concepts turns into overt intellectual *sanctioning*: While "the human subject engages in narrative recollection", Sebald states, it trades in concrete "recollections" for "the memory" (in Braese 2003, S. xx). (He adds that this equals trading personal "disturbance" for "communication" whereby Sebald in an emphatic and/ or avant-garde gesture cherishes/ sanctifies "disturbance" and denounces/ sanctions "communication".)

These concepts of "recollection" and "memory" do not refer to recent clinical literature but go back to a more philological/ philosophical line of thought from the beginning of the last

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[24] xx und „zur Heiligung gelangen" soll, und wenn dabei beklagt wird, dass die notwendige „narrative Erinnerung" immerhin „dazu führen kann, dass die der traumatischen Erinnerung wesentliche Genauigkeit und starke Wirkung verloren geht", wenn also tatsächlich „der Verlust der für das Ereignis so wesentlichen Unfassbarkeit" durch dessen Erinnerung befürchtet wird (Caruth 1995a, S. 94f.),

[25] A recent example of this line of thought is quoted in Braese 2003, S. 969.

century: Most often these concepts are quoted from a text which Walter Benjamin wrote in the 1930 (quoting the psychoanalyst Theodore Reik).[26] And as is typical for philological/ philosophical concepts of this time they are used in the form of a dichotomy of hierarchical terms of which one is *sanctified* (the quasi-metaphysical "memory") while the other is *sanctioned* (concrete "recollection"). Therefore, Sebald even today considers this "trade" as something detrimental and thus implicitly passes judgment on any personal and cultural attempt to acquire narrative "recollections" of lived-through experiences and to "communicate" it to others. Why narrative "recollections" should be detrimental is not at all explained by Sebald, Caruth, and other authors. Most important here, once again, is to not overlook the emotional aspects of this intellectual (and literary) style of thinking. The affective charge of the impulse to sanction a theoretical concept is quite high: "While the human subject engages in narrative recollection", and while it relinquishes the quasi-metaphysical "memory" and trades it in for "recollections" the person is not only harmed but falls guilty: s/he "participates in a betrayal which constitutes a breach of confidence vis-à-vis the deceased" (in Braese 2003, S. 969).[27] Apparently, the most prominent affects here are guilt, shame and aggression. (ggg This, in fact, corresponds with my emotional experience during the interactional sequences discussed above). What I have called a (quasi-)religious attachment to intellectual ideas ("trauma", "memory", "art" and so forth) in this case turns out to also be a highly emotional attachment to deeply ingrained and inter-generationally transmitted guilt feeling vis-à-vis "the deceased". (Thinking back to my idiosyncratic - but possibly indicative – reaction while corresponding with the editors, my anxiety at the time should probably be rephrased: Maybe what I unconsciously was afraid of was not only that no narratologist and/ or "Germanist" would ever talk to me again if I violate the 'code of honors' and touch upon unacknowledged institutional taboos and conflicts, but, even more, I would "breach the confidence vis-à-vis the deceased" narratologists.)

Quite surprisingly, the above quoted utterances by Sebald and Caruth were affirmatively discussed in a recent issue of the journal *Psyche* by xx Braese who wrote about Primo Levi. The *Psyche* is neither predominantly geared towards poststructual authors nor to philologists (neither is Braese a predominantly poststructural author xx). Rather the *Psyche* has long been and still is the most important journal of psychoanalysis in Germany. It seems all the more baffling that Braese's article containing largely affirmative references to Caruth and Sebald passed the editors' board of

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[26] Walter Benjamin's text xx

[27] „Indem [das sich schreibend erinnernde Subjekt] das Gedächtnis aufgibt zugunsten der Erinnerung, die Verstörung zugunsten der Mitteilung, weiß es sich beteiligt an einem Verrat, der den Toten die Treue bricht" (in Braese 2003, S. 969).

this journal (in particular since Braese's quite instructive and illuminating paper on Primo Levi could have easily done without these references.) It seems hardly imaginable that psychoanalysis or any discipline which is engaged in psycho-therapy research could adhere to a metaphysical concept of "memory" and favour it before (xx) "narrative recollection"; inconceivable it is that any theory on psycho-therapy would opt for a principal of personal "disturbance" as opposed to "communication", or that it was susceptible to guilt-ridden notions of the "betrayal […] of the deceased". Yet Braese's article did appear there and, even more, was included in the *Psyche*'s most recent special issue on *The Past in the Present. Time – Narration – History.* Thus, this tradition of thought has to be taken to represent an intellectual discourse which is not at all untypical for substantial sectors of psychoanalysis, both poststructural and more traditional psychoanalysis.

Accordingly, the *Psyche*'s special issue encompasses yet another article which is largely based on Benjamin's (and Theodor Reik's) philosophical dichotomy of "memory" versus "narrative recollection". The paper authored by Hock even more poignantly stresses that there always aught to remain a "residue" of analysis – and enlightenment. One of the most essential issues of psychoanalysis, Hock states, "is about the impossibility to entirely dissolve the object into its context of causal inter-relations". There aught to remain "[…] an unhistorical core of the unconscious" which will "never be symbolized". Moreover, Hock emphatically opts for "the object's unyielding steadfastness vis-à-vis the disintegrating and putrefying force of analysis". [28] Hock's "object" refers to the person in analysis and to Lacans "'object *a*' as source of the desire" at the same time. And the connotations of "putref[ication]" and physical decay are to be taken quite seriously since Hock extensively quotes Reik's allegory of the Egyptian mummies which "dissolve" when being exhumed. This is remarkable since, here, it seems to be implied that the psychoanalytic findings in therapy, too, dissolve when being unearthed. (It, however, remains unexplained what, in this case, the therapeutic benefit of this psychoanalytic procedure could be.)

To be sure, Hock's statements about Benjamin, "recollection", and "putref[ication]" are offset by his explicit concession that psychoanalysis is about "transforming the unconscious into symbolic representation" (838); and Hock implicitly presumes this to be the general consensus between him and his readers and of psychoanalysis on the whole. However, the emphasis and the affective charge of Hock's article, in particular his resume at the end, is clearly invested in the enthusiasm for "the object's unyielding steadfastness vis-à-vis the disintegrating and putrefying force of analysis". And in this he resembles – and even surpasses – Braese's emphasis of the

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[28] "Unbeugsamkeit des Objekts vor der zersetzenden Kraft der Analyse xx

ontological inexpressibility of the unfathomable trauma and Sebald's notion of recollection as "betrayal […] of the deceased".

While Hock's assessments about the "impossibility" to illuminate all "causal inter-relations […] of an object" are undoubtedly correct – in fact they state a truism of any hermeneutical endeavour – the question rather is: Why would one so emphatically insist on this as a psychoanalyst and philologist writing about issues of history, memory and narration in the year 2004? To put it in a more pointed manner: Why should one engage in a latently metaphysical and unscientific nostalgia of the "trauma" and cherish an "unhistorical core of the unconscious"? Why not simply try to get as far as we can in our attempts to understand the unconscious or the conscience, for that matter? Aren't there still many methodological and theoretical options to venture into in future research about psyche and culture? Just very recently there seem to be vibrant new fields in developmental psychoanalysis, in attachment research, in infant studies, in psycho-traumatological and psycho-somatic psychoanalysis, in qualitative-empirical narration analysis. Especially since the philologies again and again prove incapable to seriously explore these untapped options of qualitative-empirical culture studies a psychoanalyst, at least, might take the scientific freedom to do so.

xxx 14. How scientific and/ or 'philological' is psychoanalysis? – a letter from the editors' of *Psyche*

However, looking at the statements by Hock, Braese Sebald, Caruth and at other examples of this rather the wide-spread nostalgia – psychoanalytically speaking: melancholia – about the ontological inexpressibility of the trauma and the inaccessible and an-analysable core of human (un-)consciousness (even more: the sanctification and the aesthetization of concepts of "trauma"/ "core"/ "remainder") any researcher who is empirically oriented (i.e. doesn't have metaphysical leanings) must not only wonder about today's philologies and about their "Rephilologisierung". He also has to ask himself: What do we have to think of today's psychoanalysis? Are there also in psychoanalysis institutional habits and behavioural patterns which support fixed traditions of interpretation like the hermeneutical "Interpretationsgewohnheiten" I mentioned with the "Geisteswissensschaften"? And what would be even more problematic: Are there fixed patterns and affectively charged traditions of epistemological and institutional conduct which overrule scientific reasoning? Is there an institutional 'acting-out' in defence of these – antiscientific – patterns ('acting-out' understood, as above, to be the opposite of acknowledging and/ or resolving

epistemological ambivalences and institutional conflicts)? Might it be the case that there even is an 'inability to become interdisciplinary' in psychoanalysis comparable to what has been said about the "Geisteswissenschaften"? And if so, where precisely does it come from historically, i.e. in terms of inter-generational and institutional transmissions generated by "the deceased"? Maybe the most tantalizing question for literary studies persons like myself is: Is one therefore ill-advised as interdisciplinary researcher of the philological object domain to turn towards psychoanalysis in order to find support for conceptualising cultural phenomena in a psychological, interactional, and explanatory perspective? Eventually, in terms of the topic of this paper these different queries maybe best summarized in asking whether psychoanalysis or at least certain sectors of psychoanalytic publishing has to be called 'philological': Is there a 'philological psychoanalysis' in the problematic sense of the word as define above.

Adding another interactional sequence might help to clarify these – mostly rhetorical questions and differentiate the hypothesis. This sequence consists of written correspondence which – once again – came to my knowledge coincidentally since there is no systematic meta research on issues of institutional analysis; and the empirical material in general is not freely available. Therefore, this interactional sequence, for the already mentioned reasons, suffers from the same methodological deficiencies as the sequences discussed above. The correspondence concerns a particular decision of the board of editors' of *Psyche* regarding a manuscript which was sent in for publication. The manuscript presented the analysis of a literary text using recent psycho-traumatological resources. It argued that the fictional text in its main figures and their actions and interactions portrays the psychological situation of individuals who, being the children of parents traumatised by World War II in Japan, were afflicted by the inter-generational transmission of psycho-traumatic interaction patterns. The *Psyche*'s board of editors' decided to not accept the manuscript for publication.

It certainly cannot be the issue here to evaluate the quality of the manuscript and discuss the editors' board rejection. Rather what I will attempt to discuss are the reasons which were given for this decision since they might help us to better understand – rather: reconstruct – the patterns of thought which guide the epistemological decision making patterns of the psychoanalytic journal the *Psyche* as represented by its board of editors; it might also give further insight about what the concept "philological psychoanalysis" could mean.

Therefore, I would like to quote some of the comments from the evaluation summary report which the editor-in-chief sent to the author and which he himself quoted from the individual referees' written statements:

(1) "The manuscript is intriguing in some way in that it contains an extensive text analysis."

(2) "While the manuscript's account of the mental and interactional dynamics of inter-generational psycho-trauma transmission is clinically correct […] one cannot escape the impression that the author projects [these] assumptions onto the text".

(3) "The text of the literary novel itself" (which is narrated from the perspective of the adult children; H.W.) "does not contain any information about the parents' psycho-traumatic experience during World War II [other than the fact] that in the beginning of the novel it is mentioned that a WWII bombardment destroyed the house of the protagonist's mother" – the implication of this comment being that therefore the manuscript lacks plausibility.

(4) "[While the manuscript's argument] shows a certain amount of plausibility it, however, remains quite speculative. One cannot escape the impression that this plausibility is fabricated by the author him/herself […] to begin with he puts his observations in an order which suggests plausibility […]".

(5) "Somewhat aggravating is how the author juggles around with psycho-traumatological terms […]".

(6) "The analysis itself in a way has the character of an obsession".

(7) "The author of the manuscript engages in a true furor interpretandi, thus, amassing a large amount of evidence in support of his argument about a trans-generational psycho-trauma […] this evidence, of course, from case to case is more or less plausible. One has the impression the author of the novel had a text book of psycho-traumatology right next to his desk while writing his novel".

(8) "The manuscript deals with the fictional characters as if they were real persons."

(9) The "interpretative narrowing" and "burocratic systematisation of a fictional text [according to psycho-traumatological concepts] is annoying";

(10) „The protagonist of the novel describes his first encounter and falling in love with his cousin with the words: 'It was as if I went down the street, without presupposing any evil, and was hit out of the blue by a soundless flash of lightening'. If one associates [as the manuscript's author does] such a flash and/ or 'coup de foudre' with the psycho-semantic field of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki [and if this comparison was only for heuristic reasons as the author claims] than this truly constitutes an interpretative rape/ abuse of the text".[29]

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[29] (1) Die Arbeit übt einen eigentümlichen Reiz aus. Sie besteht aus einer reinen Textinterpretation. (2) Die „Feststellungen" bezüglich psycho-traumatologischer Sachverhalte

I will refrain from extensively commenting on the specific issues which are touched upon by these referees' statements. It should, however, not remain unsaid that most statements are vague and unspecific to the extent that the author of the manuscript is enabled to draw but a view concrete conclusions as to how s/he could change and improve the manuscript. (Also, no comments specifically referred to the psychoanalytic and/ or psycho-traumatological premises of the paper.) Moreover, some of the statements seem to be emotionally charged and, thus, indicate a perplexing lack of adequate professional conduct. The general mode of interaction seems to be situated on the level of an emotionally charged counter-transference reaction to the manuscript and maybe the literary text which is dealt with therein – as if an affective judgement of taste had been made rather than an analytic judgement of scientific quality. In a way – and this constitutes the central correspondence with the interactional sequence of the narratology conference – the referees' statements mostly express that the majority of the editors' board felt that they "just didn't like the manuscript". On the other hand one may safely assume that the manuscript which was the object of this evaluation had weaknesses and could be ameliorated in many respects; maybe it even was defective to the extent of being beyond repair. (And yet, the manuscript must have had its merits, and the internal discussion seemed to have been quite controversial: The editor-in-chief informed the author that the manuscript had an unprecedented affect on the referees

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sind „"klinisch richtig […] aber man bekommt den Verdacht nicht los, dass der Autor genau dieses hineinliest." (3) „Die [auf die zweite Generation übertragenen traumatischen Erfahrung der Elterngeneration] kommt allerdings im ganzen Roman nicht zur Sprache, […] Ganz am Anfang wird ein Bombardement erwähnt, das das Haus der Mutter zerstört hat." (4) „Das Ganze, obwohl über eine gewissen Plausibilität verfügend, bleibt dennoch sehr spekulativ. Man wird den Eindruck nicht los, das die Plausibilität vom Autor herbeigeführt wird, zunächst stellt er alle Elemente so zusammen, daß ein plausibler Eindruck entstehen kann […]". (5) „Was etwas ärgerlich ist, wie er mit trauma-psychologischen Begriffen geradezu jongliert". (6) Die Analyse „hat selbst den Charakter einer gewissen Obsession". (7) „Der Verfasser verwendet nun einen wahren interpretatorischen Furor darauf, Belege für ein transgenerationelles Trauma beim Ich-Erzähler […] zu finden. […] Das ist dann naturgemäß manchmal mehr, manchmal weniger plausibel. Man hat den Eindruck, der Autor habe bei der Abfassung seines Romans ein Lehrbuch der Psychotraumatologie neben dem PC." (8) „Dem Verfasser werden die Romangestalten zu realen Traumapatienten. (9) Diese interpretative Verengung und buchhalterische Fixierung eines fiktionalen Textes ist das eigentlich Ärgerliche an der Arbeit." (10) „Wenn […] die erste Begegnung [des Protagonisten] mit der Cousine, die der Roman mit den Worten [schildert]: ‚als sei ich, nichts Böses ahnend, eine Straße entlangspaziert und hinterrücks von einem lautlosen Blitz getroffen worden […]', als das psychosemantische Wortfeld der atomaren Vernichtung von Hiroshima und Nagasaki identifiziert wird, dann ist das eine interpretative Vergewaltigung des Textes."

in that all the editors read not only the paper eventually, which hadn't happened before, but all also read the literary text which the paper worked on.[30])

At any rate, the quality of the manuscript and of the evaluation is not the question I am interested in here. What I find striking is the fact that this editors' board of a psychoanalytic journal in their affectively charged rejection of this manuscript reacted in a rather *philological* manner. Quite a view of the arguments levelled against the manuscript are not only vague and un-analytical. They constitute the same arguments which have long been used by philologists in order to de-legitimise psychological approach to literary texts. (To sum it up: the supposed equation of "fictional characters" with "real persons"; the suspicion that the analytical "plausibility is fabricated"; the feeling that literary text lacks enough "[explicit] information" to support the analytical hypothesis; the – polemic – remark that the "novel's author" must have had a psychological "text book" at hand; affective statements about "interpretative rape/ abuse" and/ or a "bureaucratic systematisation of a fictional text" through analysis; in fact, these statements in part are astonishingly naïve in terms of cultural and psychological theory.)

Here, however, these arguments – surprisingly – are used by psychoanalysts. This is perplexing. It seems as if the many decades of conflict-ridden relationship between psychoanalysis and literature/ philology – which basically worked along the lines of an unreciprocated attraction (psychoanalysis since Freud always was fond of literature and art but the philologies on the whole never liked psychoanalysis or any psychology) – today has resulted in a peculiar assimilation of attitudes and convictions. Whatever the case may be, these analysts speak like philologists who want to save literature from being 'analysed' and who are "annoyed" and "aggravated" by what they call a "bureaucratic systematisation of a fictional text [according to psycho-traumatological concepts]" – just as the majority of philologists has always been annoyed by any psychological approaches to high art literary texts.

Therefore, at least this piece of empirical evidence seems to suggest that there, indeed, is something like a 'philological psychoanalysis' in the problematic sense of the word und that there also is an 'inability to become interdisciplinary' within psychoanalysis which in its institutional workings is not only comparable to the "Geisteswissenschaften" but uses exactly the same mechanisms and arguments.

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[30] Maybe it should be added that the manuscript analysed the novel *Gefährliche Geliebte* by Japanese author Haruki Murakami (*Kokkyo No Minami. Taiyo No Nishi.*) This novel has already triggered the break-up of the famuous German TV-format *Das literarische Quartet* by Marcel Reich-Ranicki.

xxx 15. Is there a strain of anti-enlightenment sentiments as common denominator of philology and psychoanalysis?

Well, the answer to the above mentioned rhetorical questions, of course, is "no". There is a lot going on in recent psychological and psycho-therapy research on memory and remembering; and there is still much intriguing work to be done. Moreover, as we have learnt from emphasizing the aspect of institutional interaction analysis while looking at the narratology conference: the concept of personal idiosyncracies and matters of coincidence is not very conducive to understand what the interactional principals of the institution are. As odd and idiosyncratic Hock's utterances may seem coming from a psychoanalyst they are significant and they are indicative of a certain tradition of thought which is part of institutional psychoanalysis – and maybe even of the philologies and humanities in general since Braese is a literature studies scholar and Hock while being a psychoanalyst received a philological doctorate. So, the question which really is at the heart of Hock's and Braese's peculiar statements is still to be formulated. (And here we might come back to an issue which I only alluded to above when discussing the difficult correspondence with the editing committee: We might come back to the core of what I assumed to be a psycho-traumatic experience and/ or structure on the institutional level of narratology and the philologies, an area of experience which somehow was psycho-traumatic in nature but wasn't mentally/ institutionally integrated and mourned and which therefore was inter-generationally transferred to us, the younger ones, and hampered the prospects of our actual scientific endeavours.)

The most striking aspect in Hock's article, to my mind, is that he does not refrain from the semantics of "Unbeugsamkeit" (unyielding steadfastness) and of "Zersetzung" (disintegration, putrefication). Since the "Unbeugsamkeit" carries heroic and revolutionary connotations and the "Zersetzung" represents a historically quite laden term: It used to be one of the most well known key words and political slogans of anti-intellectual, anti-democratic, and of course anti-psychoanalytical forces since the times of right-wing struggle against the Weimar republic in Germany (which collapsed into Nazism in 1933), which was also frequently used by right-wing and anti-democratic forces of post-war Germany. "Zersetzung" in essence indicates a not only conservative but reactionary intellectual and political position. The combination of revolutionary and anti-intellectual connotations ("Unbeugsamkeit"/ "Zersetzung"), in fact, results in a correspondence with the intellectual mind set of the 'conservative revolution' from the 1920s (Stefan George xx) – which once again underlines the more politically ominous aspects of this

intellectual tradition. Stefan Breuer in his highly acknowledged books on this subject matter more appropriately refers to conservative revolutionary thinkers as "aesthetic fundamentalism" which emphasizes that this sort of thinking does not only have political implications (as the concept 'conservative revolution' suggests) but also in some respects is a form of aesthetic and philological thinking.

All the more surprising it seems that the passages about "Unbeugsamkeit" (unyielding steadfastness) and "Zersetzung" (disintegration, putrefication), too, passed the editors' board of *Psyche*, let alone the bitter-sweet, almost romantic devotion to an "unhistorical core" and the "desire" for an undividable "residue" of analysis. And yet, is there not an overarching theme, and in fact a philological theme in these passages of Hock's article which actually does render them quite passable today – especially in the view of readers and scholars from a more philologically and hermeneutically tradition which does comprise both literary studies persons and psychoanalysts? And does not this theme carry an emotional strain of a melancholic sort (which in this case comes with a reference to Walter Benjamin who extensively wrote on melancholia which, however, Hock does not explicitly deal with)? Is it not that this melancholia about the unfathomable is a quite common emotional facet not only in art and literature but also within the academic fields of literature studies und the philologies (which really rather aught to be devoted to intellectual curiosity, psycho-affective sensitivity, and scientific sobriety at the same time)?[31]

And to put these questions in perspective with our conference on narratology: Didn't the angry outcry of the young person in the conference's audience stating that s/he personally just does not like to deal with psychopathology correspond with Hock's statements in that it reflects Hock's emotionally most charged impulse: to be steadfastly unyielding ("unbeugsam") which here means: to be unyielding in the face of "psychopathology" that seemed to "putrefy" and disintegrate ("zersetzen") not only the "unhistorical core of the unconscious" but maybe also the "core" of "narratology" and "philology"? And wasn't the most burning desire of this person's angry outcry to protect what s/he felt are the "consciously committed acts" of aesthetic representation and what in her/is mind was threatened by "psychopathology". i.e. "analysis"? Is it not that, analytically speaking, the aggression which is attached to such outcries of unyielding steadfastness is the all to well known flip side of seemingly mellow melancholia? And hasn't this kind of aggression always been the flip side of philological humanism which made it so very susceptible to worldly powers – the impulse to *sanction* behind the desire to *sanctify* certain expressions of art and philosophical ideas?

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[31] See

Well, some of these questions clearly are too big to be answered in one paper. Be this as it may, the person from the audience decrying psychopathology wasn't a sociologist let alone a psychologist – s/he was a philologist; and this suggests the thought that the impulse which expressed itself here can be understood as rising from an disposition of philological melancholia about hermeneutically un-analysable and: not to be analysed "unhistorical core" of art and literature.

Thus, as odd as the statements and impulses which were displayed by Caruth, Sebald, Hock, Braese and the person at the narratology conference might appear at first they seem to have a common mental and interactional structure. Also this helps us to find the most relevant question behind the heterogeneous assortment of observations which I assembled here. Since viewing it from this structural angel, trying to understand these observations may well come down to asking the question of whether some authors in psychoanalysis (poststructuralist and conventional approaches alike) as well as in the philologies not only show (quasi-)religious attachments to intellectual conepts (instead of using and modifying these concepts as tool of research) but, moreover, do harbor leanings to anti-enlightenment positions. Do main stream "Geisteswissenschaften" and some of psychoanalysis harbor anti-reflective and also anti-narrative impulses; and to put this in stronger words: do they, thus, partake in the forces which have hampered and endangered the progress of enlightenment and modernity in the emphatic sense of the word? If there, indeed, was such an anti-enlightenment heritage this then would certainly show in the philologies' relationship towards other sciences (in particular with those which are less hermeneutical/ philological and more analytical and methodologically controlled). Since – if I may refer to a truism - the respective "other" always has been the most provocative issue for any form of un-enlightened and religious selfhood.

xxx 16. Botho Strauß's essay *Anschwellender Bocksgesang*: a rightist tune in philology and psychoanalysis?

While the question about philological and even psychoanalytic humanism's presumed anti-enlightenment sentiments – which, thinking in political terms, one could not escape to also consider as a potential of reactionary sentiments - might indeed, be too big a question to be fathomed in one paper, it needs, I think, to be followed up by at least one more hint in order to give some additional substance to this issue. Being a literary studies person myself reading Hock's emphasis on the "unhistorical core" and "residue" of analysis which should "never be

symbolized" and "putrefied by narrative recollection" immediately made me think of Botho Strauß's *Anschwellender Bocksgesang*. When Strauß' essay appeared in 1994 in the liberal weekly *Der Spiegel* an uproar went through the intellectual und political public which caused a long and in many ways quite circular (xx) debate. For, this essay was one of the first overtly anti-enlightenment and/ or right wing ideology text issued by a respected intellectual and literary author who had generally been held to hold liberal views and even to be a leftist (who used to be a member of the German Communist Party, DKP, in the 1970s). This essay was written in the tone of the right wing 'conservative revolutionaries' of the 1920s and in 1994 signalled the advent of a new kind of right-wing intellectualism among former liberal intellectual protagonists. (Other authors like Martin Walser with his *Freidenspreisrede* or Sloterdijk with his *Elmauer Rede*, in certain respects already Enzensberger, Syberberg, Biermann and others in commenting on the first Golf War comparing Hussein to Hitler have followed.) Moreover, the 1990s in Germany at the same time was the decade of the advent of right-wing intellectualism articulated by persons who were not at all liberals but always had held extremist right wing views but hadn't articulated themselves or hadn't been able to raise public interest.

Strauß's enigmatic, ambiguous, highly poeticised and yet also fervently political essay is hard to summarize and even harder to translate. It states ideas about and sensations of "world-historical turbulences", of a "pervasive seismic noises", a general "culture shock" and "the tearing-up of the world by the god of blast and blare". He states mystical fantasies about "spontaneous lynching", "sacred violence", and the "terror of preconceptions" which, however, the author seems to cherish rather than fear and which he takes as a valuable "proto-political initiation" and source of a "right(ist) fantasy". Furthermore, the author evokes the necessity of "the victim of the foundational violence", a victim "who was not only the object of hatred but also the creation of adoration". Most importantly with reference to the topic of this paper the central conclusion which Strauß draws from his deeply felt observations is – the enthusiastic claim of an anti-enlightenment stance: Strauß argues the necessity to secure the "presence of un-enlightened history"; instead of narrative recollection he opts for a kind of "depth memory", a procedure of mystical contemplation rather than interactional recollection which is performed by the contemplating "outsider" or the "monk" but is not elucidated at all in any technical or theoretical terms but seems to be the fulfilment of the principal of "un-inlightened history" (einlösung xx).[32]

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[32] Botho Strauß's essay has met a quite controversial echo and was quite justifiably reproached to ventilate patterns of reactionary philosophical and political thinking. These reproaches were of an emphatic nature and could not really be levelled on scientifically based grounds because the philologies, for the very reasons which I discuss in the above close reading, are not yet adequately equipped theoretically and methodologically to tackle

(This kind of non-narrative and solitary recollection in a similar fashion can also be found in Martin Walsers famous/ infamous *Friedenspreisrede* and in essays by Sloterdijk.[33]) xx more on Strauß

The structural parallel to Hock's article and to the statements by Sebald and Caruth (and indirectly by Braese) is striking: While Hock is far from explicitly or implicitly advancing rightist political and/ or societal stance he does share one of Strauß' most emphatically held convictions, or rather intellectual affects: the anti-enlightenment impulse against narrative recollection! Strauß enthusiastically stresses the need for the "presence of un-enlightened history" and articulates fantasies about a process of "depth-memory"; and Hock emphatically contemplates the "unhistorical core" or "residue" of analysis and articulates fantasies about "the desire". And while Sebald's and Caruth's statements are, of course, as far from any political extremism as Hock is they, too, share this anti-enlightenment impulse. Moreover, they share parts of the aggressive affect to sanction and condemn which characterizes Strauß' poetic melancholy about "sacred violence" and ritual victimization (more about this in Strauß and Hock) – and which is a complementary component of any kind of any kind of idealism, be it religious, poetic, intellectual or philological in nature. Strauß in the passages of his essay which are devoted less to poetic enthusiasm and rather express thoughts of culture critique bitterly condemns various groups and/ or cultural practices . . . xx , and Sebald (and implicitly also Caruth) considers any "human subject" who "engages in narrative recollection" not only to be erroneous in intellectual and/ or philosophical respects but to fall morally guilty of "betrayal" and of a "breach of confidence vis-à-vis the deceased"; and he implicitly demands to be "steadfastly unyielding" to the to "putrefying" force of the analysing and "betraying" dynamics of human intellectual activity. (With Hock this aggressive impulse to condemn and sanction the other of "core", "residue", and "desire" is articulated in a more indirect manner xx when he implicitly presupposes Benjamin's concepts of

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interactional questions like this. One cannot approach questions regarding the political and interactional functions of a text especially when the author implicitly claims an artistic/ aesthetic point of view as is the case with Strauß. Thus, the only thing we can do is to point out historical correspondences (regarding the thinking and publishing of the 'conservative revolutionaries'/ 'aesthetic fundamentalists' or right wing publishers in the 1920s, a comparison which, indeed, seems ominous enough because of the advent of Nazism and WWII shortly thereafter). Other than that from a traditional philology's methodological point of view the only option left is to engage in an ideological critique of this thinking which does not represent a tenable scientific approach. (For an attempt to view Strauß's essay and literature on the basis of narcissism theories see Weilnböck xx.) Therefore, the interactional question whether Strauß's essay and approach of aesthetic interaction does in fact tend to support patterns of intellectual and and psycho-affective interaction with his readers which foster rigid defence mechanisms, counter-productive acting-out and screen activities (as splitting and projective identification; see Weilnböck 2005a/ b), thus, still has to be considered an unasked question.

[33] In his *Friedenspreisrede* Martin Walser insists on his entirely "private", non-public and non-interactional mode of recollection as opposed to any public discourse of memory and historic recollection in the societal sphere (see Hardtmann 2001 for a psycho-dynamic evaluation).

revolutionary violence, 'choc' and 'explosion' which are inherent to the international Benjamin-discourse since the early 1980s.)

If one attempts to roughly describe the gestalt of the structural correspondences among these authors their statements share three main components: (1) the impulse to avoid or at least restrict processes of narrative recollection as well as personal and societal enlightenment, (2) the impulse to idealize certain philosophical concepts and intellectual practices and put them into the place of 'recollection' (Strauß' "depth-memory", Hock's "residue" and "desire", Caruth's "trauma", Sebald's "guilt" and "betrayal [of the] deceased"), and (3) the impulse to sanction/ condemn certain other concepts and intellectual practices which have to do with narrative recollection, (psychological) analysis and general enlightenment and which these authors seem to perceive as incompatible and even threatening to the idealized concepts.

xxx 17. The scientific response to anti-enlightenment dynamics in the philologies: Interdisciplinary research in qualitative-empirical meta research

Viewing it from this quite far-reaching structural angle the question at stake takes on an even more principle dimension: One feels prompted to ask: How secularized are the "Geisteswissenschaften", really? How much are they still devoted to the metaphysical attitudes of 'art-religion' which were characteristic of 18th and 19th bourgeois culture as well as of most of the academic institutions of the time. How emancipated are the "Geisteswissenschaften" from 19th century concepts of "philological education" and "Bildung". In the end this really amounts to the question: How scientific are the "Geisteswissenschaften"? – especially if they decided to re-philologize which basically means to refrain from any explanatory questions (of aesthetic interaction) and stick to question of historical description (of literary issues, motives, ideas, forms, intertextual phenomena etc.) How scientific is a scholarly field which does not want to proceed to the level of explaining the phenomena of its object domain but decides to limit itself to describing it? This, indeed, is another set of big questions which, here, can only be mentioned.

Now, above and beyond considering these stuctural correspondences in more detail, which cannot be done under these insufficient methodological premises, I wonder whether it is not this very contemporary trend of intellectual anti-enlightenment, this theoretical roll-back of re-philologization which is also at the heart of what I observed as the complex phenomenon of the "Geisteswissenschaften's 'inability to become interdisciplinary'. … …

… … …